HSBC UK Bank Plc · DRN-5992448

The complaint Mr B complains HSBC UK Bank Plc (‘HSBC’) hasn’t refunded funds he lost as the result of a scam. What happened Both parties are familiar with the circumstances of the complaint, so I’ll only summarise the key details here. Mr B began speaking with someone he met on a dating application. He said they communicated for around two weeks before she began to ask for money. Between March and May 2025 Mr B made numerous payments as part of the scam from his account with HSBC. He said these were to help the scammer with an investment, a phone card, medical and accommodation bills. In June 2025, Mr B became aware he’d been scammed and contacted HSBC. HSBC said it refunded an eligible payment under the Payment Systems Regulator Reimbursement Rules, and hasn’t refunded the remaining disputed payments. Mr B has said he isn’t complaining about the refunded payment. Unhappy with HSBC’s decision not to refund the card payments made as part of the scam, Mr B raised the matter with the Financial Ombudsman Service. One of our Investigators looked into the complaint and didn’t uphold it. They thought HSBC should have intervened on more occasions than it did, but as Mr B wasn’t honest about the reason for the payments when he spoke with HSBC, our Investigator concluded he would have continued to be untruthful if HSBC intervened further, such that the scam wouldn’t have been uncovered. As an agreement could not be reached, the complaint has been passed to me for a final decision. What I’ve decided – and why I’ve considered all the available evidence and arguments to decide what’s fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint. I’m sorry that Mr B has been the victim of a scam. I realise he’s lost a significant sum of money and I don’t underestimate the impact this has had on him. And so, I’d like to reassure him that I’ve read and considered everything he’s said in support of his complaint. But I’ll focus my comments on what I think is relevant. If I don’t mention any specific point, it’s not because I’ve failed to take it on board and think about it, but because I don’t think I need to comment on it to reach what I think is a fair and reasonable outcome. I know this will come as a disappointment to Mr B, but having done so, I won’t be upholding his complaint. I’ll explain why. In broad terms, the starting position at law is that banks and other payment service providers are expected to process payments and withdrawals that a customer authorises it to make, in

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accordance with the Payment Services Regulations and the terms and conditions of the customer’s account. Mr B authorised the payments in question here – so even though he was tricked into doing so and didn’t intend for his money to end up in the hands of a scammer, he is presumed liable in the first instance. But as a matter of good industry practice, HSBC should also have taken proactive steps to identify and help prevent transactions – particularly unusual or uncharacteristic transactions – that could involve fraud or be the result of a scam. However, there is a balance to be struck: as while banks should be alert to fraud and scams to act in their customers’ best interests, they can’t reasonably be involved in every transaction. I’ve also thought about the Contingent Reimbursement Model which HSBC is a voluntary signatory of and the Authorised Push Payment reimbursement rules. Neither cover card payments so aren’t relevant to the payments Mr B is complaining about. I’ve thought about whether HSBC acted fairly and reasonably in its dealings with Mr B when he made the payments, or whether it should have done more than it did. Having considered everything, much like the Investigator I’m not persuaded that any further intervention from HSBC would have prevented Mr B’s losses. I’ll explain why. I should explain that for me to find it fair and reasonable that HSBC should refund Mr B requires more than a finding that it ought to have intervened further than it did. I would need to find not only that HSBC failed to proportionately intervene where it ought reasonably to have done so – but crucially I’d need to find that but for this failure the subsequent loss would’ve been avoided. That latter element concerns causation. A proportionate intervention will not always result in the prevention of a payment. And if I find it more likely than not that such a proportionate intervention by HSBC wouldn’t have revealed the payments were part of a fraud or scam, then I couldn’t fairly hold HSBC liable for not having prevented them from being made. HSBC intervened prior to processing some of the payments and spoke with Mr B by phone. I’ve listened to those calls and in summary Mr B wasn’t forthcoming with his answers to HSBC. He gave various reasons for the payments which weren’t accurate, for example during one intervention Mr B said he was sending funds to a friend to help with an event they were organising. HSBC probed Mr B on his answers and he said he’d known the friend for many years; he’d received the details via message which is how they usually communicate and he’d called the friend and spoken about the event among other things and so was satisfied his friend’s correspondence hadn’t been intercepted. HSBC said it was concerned it could be a scam and they asked him if he’d been asked for multiple payments for different reasons and Mr B said he hadn’t. HSBC also questioned the recent funds that had entered Mr B’s account, and he explained he has a high interest account elsewhere which is only linked with his HSBC account and if he wants funds from that account they must be withdrawn to HSBC. Later the same day Mr B called HSBC to complain about this intervention (maintaining his cover story) and the time spent on the phone. During this call he explained his intention to close his HSBC account due to the friction it’s placing on his transactions. I’ve also reviewed the correspondence between Mr B and the scammer. The communications show Mr B spoke with the scammer regarding the above intervention after it took place. Mr B told the scammer HSBC put him through ‘hoops’ to verify the payment and that it can’t happen again. That they need a different way to transfer the remainder of the funds. He also told the scammer he’d concocted a story about the money being for an event.

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During another human intervention Mr B said a payee was an old school friend which we know wasn’t the case. And that he was moving funds to another of his accounts as he will be closing his HSBC account. Mr B also made payments using an account he held with a banking provider, I’ll call ‘S’. S intervened when Mr B made a payment in June 2025 and spoke with Mr B by phone, during the call he provided the following answers. He said the payment was related to medical bills for his new partner, they’d met a few years ago while travelling and that they tend to spend numerous months together throughout the year. We now know these answers weren’t entirely accurate. Additionally, I believe Mr B did what he could to circumvent interventions when making payments towards the scam. He told the scammer he was reducing a payment to £4,000, having previously sent just over £5,000 via the same method, hoping it wouldn’t attract security questions. When S intervened Mr B asked if the payment would have worked if it was less than £10,000. And, as mentioned, he stopped using HSBC to make scam payments due to the checks it carried out. I think that Mr B was under the scammer’s spell to such a degree that even if HSBC had intervened further than it did, it wouldn’t have uncovered the scam or prevented Mr B’s losses for the reasons outlined above. As I don’t think HSBC could have reasonably prevented Mr B’s loss it wouldn’t be fair or reasonable to hold it liable for them. I’ve also considered if HSBC could reasonably have helped recover Mr B’s funds, when the scam was reported. However, given the time between the payments being made and the scam being reported to HSBC, I don’t think there was any prospect of it recovering Mr B’s funds. I’m sorry to disappoint Mr B further, but I’ve thought carefully about everything that has happened, and with all the circumstances of this complaint in mind I don’t think HSBC needs to refund his money. I realise this means Mr B is out of pocket and I’m really sorry he’s lost this money. However, for the reasons I’ve explained, I don’t think I can fairly or reasonably uphold this complaint. My final decision My final decision is that I do not uphold this complaint against HSBC UK Bank Plc. Under the rules of the Financial Ombudsman Service, I’m required to ask Mr B to accept or reject my decision before 28 April 2026. Charlotte Mulvihill Ombudsman

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