Financial Ombudsman Service decision

Barclays Bank UK Plc · DRN-6057296

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The verbatim text of this Financial Ombudsman Service decision. Sourced directly from the FOS published decisions register. Consumer names are reduced to initials by FOS at point of publication. Not an AI summary, not a paraphrase — every word below is the original decision.

Full decision

The complaint Mr M complains that Barclays Bank UK Plc has refused to reimburse the money he lost to what he believes was an authorised push payment (APP) scam. What happened The background to this complaint is familiar to both parties – and has been set out in detail by our Investigator - so I’ll only refer to some key events here. Mr M was looking to secure visa sponsorship for his sister who wanted to work in the UK. An acquaintance recommended an individual, I’ll refer to as ‘S’, that could help to secure a visa. Mr M was in communication with S from January 2023, discussing visa application requirements. In September 2023 Mr M paid S a £1,000 deposit from his Barclays account. He understood that this would secure a sponsorship offer, at which point he would pay the final fees. Mr M said he never received the sponsorship offer, despite repeatedly chasing S. He said S provided him with excuses for not providing the service and eventually asked for further fees for courses and consultancy before an offer could be secured. Mr M was unhappy as he considered this was different to what had originally been agreed, and so asked S to refund his deposit. Mr M said S then stopped contacting him. At this point he believed he had been scammed and reported it to Barclays. Barclays investigated what had happened but concluded that this was a buyer seller dispute, and so Mr M was not entitled to reimbursement under the Contingent Reimbursement Model (CRM) Code. Unhappy with Barclays’ response, Mr M referred his complaint to the Financial Ombudsman. Our Investigator didn’t uphold the complaint. He was not persuaded there was sufficient evidence to demonstrate that Mr M had lost money to an APP scam. As such, he considered Barclays had acted reasonably in concluding Mr M was not entitled to reimbursement under the CRM Code. Mr M disagreed and asked for an Ombudsman’s final decision. He considered the evidence demonstrated that S was operating a scam. He highlighted the following: • There was no evidence that S had carried out any legitimate service in return for the £1,000 payment. • S gave inconsistent and vague excuses for his inability to fulfil the agreement, which was not consistent with a legitimate sponsorship provider. • S introduced the need to pay additional fees more than a year after the deposit was paid, which was inconsistent with legitimate business practice. • S failed to provide the service promised, despite the fact Mr M had complied with all instructions in good faith. • The evidence our Investigator relied on – such as there being no previous fraud or scam complaints against S – could not be treated as evidence that the transaction was legitimate.

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Having considered Mr M’s further points, our Investigator explained why he was still not persuaded there was sufficient evidence to demonstrate S set out with the intention to deceive him. He maintained that Mr M was therefore not eligible to reimbursement under the CRM Code. Mr M disagreed and asked for an Ombudsman’s final decision. So, the complaint has been passed to me to decide. What I’ve decided – and why I’ve considered all the available evidence and arguments to decide what’s fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint. Having done so, I have reached the same outcome as our Investigator. I appreciate this will be deeply disappointing for Mr M. I do not underestimate the impact losing this sum of money has had on him and his wider family. But for the reasons I explain below, I can’t fairly hold Barclays liable for his loss. I’m aware I’ve summarised this complaint and the relevant submissions briefly, in much less detail than has been provided, and in my own words. No discourtesy is intended by this. In this decision, I’ve focussed on what I think is the heart of the matter here. Therefore, if there’s something I’ve not mentioned, it isn’t because I’ve ignored it - I haven’t. I’m satisfied I don’t need to comment on every individual point or argument to be able to reach what I consider is the right outcome. Our rules allow me to do this, reflecting the informal nature of the Financial Ombudsman as a free alternative to the courts. My role is to consider the evidence presented by the parties to this complaint, and reach an impartial, fair and reasonable decision, based on what I find to be the facts of the case. Who is responsible for Mr M’s loss? In broad terms, the starting position in law is that a bank is expected to process payments and withdrawals that a customer authorises, in accordance with the Payment Services Regulations and the terms and conditions of the customer’s account. And where a customer has correctly authorised a payment, they are deemed liable for it in the first instance. However, where the customer made the payment as a consequence of the actions of a fraudster, it may sometimes be fair or reasonable for the bank to reimburse the customer even though they authorised the payment. Is Mr M entitled to reimbursement under the CRM Code Barclays was a signatory of the CRM Code while it was in place, which meant it was required to reimburse customers who had been the victim of APP scams, in all but a limited number of circumstances. But the CRM Code only applies, if the definition of a scam has been met. For this case, the relevant definition is “a transfer of funds […] where the Customer transferred funds to another person for what they believed were legitimate purposes, but which were in fact fraudulent” (DS1(2)(ii)). The CRM Code expressly excludes “private civil disputes, such as where a Customer has paid a legitimate supplier for goods, services, or digital content but has not received them, they are defective in some way, or the Customer is otherwise dissatisfied with the supplier”.

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So, for the CRM Code to apply, the customer (in this case Mr M) must have been deceived about the purpose for which their payment has been obtained, and this must be due to fraudulent intent on the part of the payee (in this case S). Mr M says he made the payment believing S would secure visa sponsorship for his sister. But although Mr M has evidenced some of his contact with S, I do not have a complete picture of what was discussed or agreed – particularly as a lot of communication appears to have happened over the telephone and those calls have not been recorded. For example, while I can see S provided Mr M with his bank details and Mr M later confirmed that a £1,000 payment had been made, I have no clear evidence to show what had been agreed between the parties regarding this payment. This is particularly relevant here, because S has disputed Mr M’s account of what had been agreed and why the visa sponsorship was not provided. Within the chat records I have seen, S says “In October, you were asked to pay for the courses and consultancy fee but you were in constant breach. You have not paid enough as per agreement (£6500+ certification courses).” I understand that S also provided a similar explanation to his bank when the scam claim was raised against him. His bank took no further action having carried out its investigation. While I appreciate that Mr M disputes S’s account, I have no clear evidence to demonstrate what was agreed. In these circumstances, I am unable to safely determine that Mr M did not receive the service he expected because of fraudulent intent on S’s behalf. The evidence I have available indicates it is equally likely that the service was not provided due to a contractual dispute or a breakdown between the parties, which would be correctly categorised as a civil dispute, which is expressly excluded under the CRM Code. Added to this, there is other evidence that leads me to conclude that it’s more likely than not S was operating legitimately: • Although Mr M’s chat history shows he was in contact with S directly, he has told us he believed he was dealing with S’s company, which I’ll refer to as M. I can see that M is registered with Companies House and was incorporated in 2013, with an up‑to‑date filing history. While registration with Companies House does not in itself confirm that a company is acting legitimately, a long and consistent filing history such as M’s is not typically associated with companies engaged in fraudulent activity. • It is significant that Mr M had been in contact with S for nearly nine months before he made any payments to him. During this time S provided guidance on what appears to be a visa application process. Again, while prior contact does not confirm that S was acting legitimately, I don’t think it is consistent with what I would expect to see if S set out to scam Mr M from the outset. In summary, while I have carefully considered the evidence Mr M has presented, I have not been persuaded that S set out to defraud Mr M. In these circumstances, I’m satisfied Barclays acted reasonably by determining that this was a civil dispute, rather than a scam, and was therefore excluded from the scope of the CRM Code. Barclays was therefore under no obligation to reimburse Mr M’s loss. Should Barclays have otherwise prevented Mr M’s loss? Outside the provisions of the CRM Code, there are circumstances where I’d expect Barclays to intervene before processing a payment if it had reason to believe a payment instruction was unusual or suspicious. But considering Mr M’s payment alongside his usual account activity I don’t think Barclays would have had any reason to consider the payment indicated

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he was at a significant risk of financial harm from fraud. So, I would not have expected it to have taken any steps before processing the payment in line with Mr M’s instructions. Barclays has also demonstrated that it contacted S’s bank on the same day Mr M reported his scam concerns, but the receiving bank refused to return funds as it considered the loss to be a civil dispute. Given my conclusions above, I would not have expected Barclays to do anything further to attempt recovery of Mr M’s funds. I know this outcome will be disappointing for Mr M. I appreciate how strongly he feels about this case. But for the reasons I’ve explained above, I do not consider that the payment in dispute here is covered under the CRM Code, or that it would be fair to hold Barclays responsible for the money lost under any of the other relevant regulations or guidance. My final decision For the reasons I’ve explained, I do not uphold this complaint. Under the rules of the Financial Ombudsman Service, I’m required to ask Mr M to accept or reject my decision before 28 April 2026. Lisa De Noronha Ombudsman

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