TA (Guinea) v Secretary of State for the Home Department

1. LORD JUSTICE MOSES: This is an application for permission to appeal following refusal by Keene LJ. It has a delayed history because the decision of the tribunal against which it is sought to appeal, that the original immigration judge’s decision on 23 Jun 2005 disclosed errors of law, was as long ago as 21 November 2005; but, as is often the case, the hearing was split into two. There was a further hearing in relation to the facts of 20 March 2006, in which after a detailed hearing the immigration judge refused the applicant’s appeals. But Keene LJ extended time for appeal and it is therefore not open to reconsider that. The question that arises is whether it was open to the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal to identify the errors of law which it did.

2. Mr Southey before me has submitted that whilst there were discrepancies of which the immigration judge sought to complain, at the end of the day he saw and heard the witness, watched him and listened to him in cross-examination, and despite what he describes as a thorough cross-examination (paragraph 17), found him to be an honest and credible witness.

3. It must be acknowledged, and it is strongly arguable, that a fact-finding body will often gain an impression of honesty or otherwise of a witness for reasons that cannot always be clearly articulated. This immigration judge, faced with discrepancies, accepted the explanation for those discrepancies (see particularly paragraph 14). Whilst it might be true that one or two of the discrepancies were not the subject of a full explanation, overall he was prepared to believe the appellant was telling the truth.

4. In those circumstances this application raises the question whether there was any error of law in adopting that approach.

5. It does seem to me that there is an arguable case which raises a significant point as to the effect within an adjudication of the impression which a witness gives when he is giving his evidence, particularly in cross-examination.

6. For those reasons I am prepared to give permission so that the matter can be fully argued and, in particular, so that the full court can consider whether it is fair to criticise the immigration judge for not being able to articulate fully the reasons why he accepted the applicant’s evidence.

7. For those reasons I give permission. Order: Application granted.