Richard Kennedy & Anor v The Information Commissioner & Anor

Preliminary matters

1. In this decision , we use the following terms to denote the meanings shown: Appellants: Richard and Liz Kennedy. Commissioner: The Information Commissioner (the First Respondent). Decision Notice: The Decision Notice of the Commissioner dated 27 February 2025, reference IC-337117-P9R5, relating to the Request. DfE: The Department for Education. Dransfield : The decision of the Upper Tribunal in Information Commissioner v Devon County Trust & Dransfield [2012] UKUT 440 (AAC) and of the Court of Appeal in Dransfield v Information Commissioner and Devon County Trust [2015] EWCA Civ 454 . FOIA: The Freedom of Information Act 2000 . Request: The request for information made to the Trust by the Appellant dated 22 March 2024, as set out in paragraph 8. School: St Paul’s Catholic College (as referred to in the Decision Notice). TRA: Teaching Regulation Agency. Trust: Bosco Catholic Education Trust (the Second Respondent).

2. Unless the context otherwise requires (or as otherwise expressly stated), references in this decision : a. to numbered paragraphs are references to paragraphs of this decision so numbered; b. to any section are references to the applicable section of FOIA; c. to the Commissioner’s “investigation” mean his investigation, for the purposes of section 50, of the Appellants’ complaint relating to the Trust ’s response to the Request.

3. Whilst we refer to the ‘Appellants’ in this decision to mean both Mr Kennedy and Mrs Kennedy, where the context requires this should be taken to mean either one of them (for example, where correspondence referred to was written by one of the Apellants on behalf of both of them).

4. We considered whether it was necessary for us to provide a closed decision. We concluded that it would not be necessary, on the basis that the reasoning behind this decision can be sufficiently understood without us needing to disclose any sensitive aspects of the material in the closed bundle. Introduction

5. This was an appeal against the Decision Notice, which (in summary) decided that section 14(1) applied in respect of the Request and accordingly that the Trust was entitled to refuse it. Background to the Appeal

6. It may be helpful to set out some background to the Request, as set out in paragraphs 5 to 10 (inclusive) of the Decision Notice (‘the complainant’ being a reference to one of the Appellants): In December 2021, the head teacher of St Paul’s Catholic College (“the School”) wrote to parents advising that the School would be increasing the number of GSCE [sic] subjects each pupil would be required to study. A key influence for that change was said to be to ensure pupils met the core requirements for the English Baccalaureate (EBacc). A group of parents, including the complainant, wrote to the School to express their concerns about the change. In particular, they were concerned about the wellbeing of pupils required to study additional subjects. They asked that the change be postponed pending more extensive consultation. Dissatisfied with the responses received, the complainant made a more formal complaint. A panel was convened to consider the complaint. Whilst the panel does appear to have identified areas in which the School’s handling of the matter could have been improved, it does not appear to have upheld the main substance of the complaints. Still dissatisfied, the complainant complained to the Department for Education (DfE)… Following the outcome of the DfE complaint process, the complainant wrote to the public authority on 3 October 2023, requesting the head teacher of the School be removed from his position. The public authority responded on 20 October 2023 stating that it considered the matter fully investigated and closed. Its reason for doing so was that the correspondence was being treated “as part of your broader complaint” and that: “The Trust Board, following its own review of the information you provided, judge that the complaint contained no new information, or referred to matters where information was not made available to the Trust and/or was considered by a least one of the organisations you have complained to.”

7. The Decision Notice also recorded, in paragraph 11, that: a. as of 1 January 2022, the School converted to academy status and joined the group of academies run by the Trust; and b. the head teacher of the School is the brother of the Trust’s Chief Executive. The Request

8. On 22 March 2024, referring to the Trust’s correspondence of 20 October 2023, the Appellants contacted the Trust by email sent via its solicitors and requested information in the following terms: “ Please could you forward all documents showing this investigation took place, its deliberations and findings including meeting minutes, accordingly. ”.

9. The Trust responded on 24 May 2024, via its solicitors, stating that the Request was considered to be vexatious pursuant to section 14(1). It declined the opportunity to carry out an internal review, considering that such a review “ was not appropriate in the circumstances ”.

10. The Appellants complained to the Commissioner about the Trust’s response to the Request and the Commissioner subsequently issued the Decision Notice. The Decision Notice

11. In the Decision Notice, the Commissioner concluded (in summary) that the Request was vexatious and therefore that the Trust was entitled to rely upon section 14(1) to refuse it.

12. In the Decision Notice, the Commissioner set out detailed comments regarding the DfE’s response to the Appellants’ complaint. He also addressed subsequent events which he considered the DfE complaint had influenced. In addition, he set out details of matters which he considered had been misrepresented by the Appellants in their complaint to him regarding the findings of other bodies.

13. The Decision Notice recorded the Appellants’ views that they had sent 11 communications to the Trust over a two-year period and that this should not represent an undue burden on it. The Decision Notice referred to the Appellants’ arguments regarding concerns with the head teacher of the School and their complaint to the DfE.

14. The Decision Notice also recorded that the Trust maintained that the Request was vexatious, with regard to: a. the volume of correspondence from the Appellants; b. the Appellants’ lack of acceptance of the findings of independent reviews; and c. the Trust’s belief, based on the previous correspondence with the Appellants, that it would never be able to resolve the situation to their satisfaction.

15. The Commissioner considered that 11 items of correspondence over a two-year period did not represent an intolerable burden on the Trust (although he commented that some of the individual items would have required a considerable amount of work to respond to). However, he considered that dealing with direct correspondence from the Appellants only represented part of the burden on the Trust. He referred to the Appellants seeking the involvement of four external organisations (including the Commissioner himself), but also noted that the involvement of the TRA appeared to have occurred after the date when the Request “ should have been responded to ”.

16. The Commissioner’s view was that the involvement of those organisations would have placed an additional burden on the Trust “ in terms of preparing its submission and responding to any follow-up queries ”. He also stated that, as far as he was aware, none of those organisations has upheld any of the most serious accusations that the Appellants had made.

17. The Commissioner therefore concluded that the Request, seen in its wider context, was vexatious.

18. The Commissioner also determined in the Decision Notice that the Trust had breached section 17(1) by issuing its refusal notice beyond the statutory timeframe of 20 working days.

19. The Decision Notice did not require the Trust to take any further steps. The appeal The grounds of appeal

20. The Appellants argued that the Request was not vexatious. Their grounds of appeal can be summarised under the following headings: a. factual errors; b. lack of fairness; c. improper assessment of exemptions; d. incorrect “public interest” balance.

21. Taking each of those headings in turn, the material aspects of the Appellants’ grounds of appeal were, in essence, that: a. factual errors: (i) the Commissioner made various factual errors in the Decision Notice, accepting “as fact” erroneous information which had been submitted by the Trust; and (ii) the Commissioner erroneously concluded that there is no evidence of misconduct by the School’s head teacher based on the DfE’s findings; b. lack of fairness: (i) the Commissioner failed to fully recognise two of his previous findings regarding GDPR failures by the Trust and wrongly considered that the Appellants had mischaracterised this as ‘wrongdoing’ of the Trust; and (ii) the Commissioner likewise failed to recognise that the DfE had found that there was “wrongdoing”; c. improper assessment of exemptions: (i) the Commissioner did not give appropriate weight to the Appellants’ concerns as former governors, or the testimonials of others and serious safeguarding concerns involving a TRA investigation; and (ii) the Commissioner did not take into account that the Trust had partially complied with their information request, whilst refusing the reminder as vexatious; and d. incorrect “public interest” balance: the Commissioner did not take into account parallels in his previous findings regarding the Trust’s GDPR practices, or that a similar FOIA request had been made by an investigative journalist showing public interest which was also refused as vexatious by the Trust. The Tribunal’s powers and role

22. The powers of the Tribunal in determining the appeal are set out in section 58, as follows: “(1) If on an appeal under section 57 the Tribunal considers— (a) that the notice against which the appeal is brought is not in accordance with the law, or (b) to the extent that the notice involved an exercise of discretion by the Commissioner, that he ought to have exercised his discretion differently, the Tribunal shall allow the appeal or substitute such other notice as could have been served by the Commissioner; and in any other case the Tribunal shall dismiss the appeal. (2) On such an appeal, the Tribunal may Review any finding of fact on which the notice in question was based. ”.

23. In summary, therefore, the Tribunal’s remit for the purposes of the appeal was to consider whether the Decision Notice was in accordance with the law. In reaching its decision, the Tribunal may review any findings of fact on which the Decision Notice was based and the Tribunal may come to a different decision regarding those facts. Essentially, the Tribunal is empowered to undertake a ‘full merits review’ of the appeal before it (so far as the Decision Notice is concerned). Mode of hearing

24. The proceedings were held by the cloud video platform. The Tribunal panel, the Appellants, the witness (see paragraph 30) and Mr Davidson joined remotely. The Tribunal was satisfied that it was fair and just to conduct the hearing in this way.

25. The Commissioner did not attend the hearing and was not represented, having previously indicated that he would rely on his written submissions and other documentary material if there was an oral hearing.

26. On one occasion during the hearing, one of the members of the Tribunal Panel lost their connection to the video link. This occurred whilst the Panel was raising questions with the Appellants. After several minutes, and to avoid further delaying proceedings (which at that point were close to being concluded anyway), the parties agreed that the Panel could continue its questions on the basis that the other member would be subsequently informed of the matters covered. We confirm that this was done at the start of the Panel’s deliberations and accordingly the Panel member in question was therefore aware of everything which had been said during their lost connection.

27. There were no other interruptions of note during the hearing. The evidence and submissions

28. The Tribunal read and took account of the following: a. an open bundle of evidence and pleadings (which was the latest in a series of updated bundles, provided to the Tribunal on 24 September 2025); b. a closed bundle, which contained information responsive to the Request (which had been withheld by the Trust); c. a bundle of authorities; d. a written skeleton argument provided by the Appellants; and e. a written skeleton argument provided by the Trust.

29. The open bundle contained various witness statements on behalf of the Appellants. One witness statement was essentially a character reference in support of the Appellants and had no bearing on our decision (on the basis that it was not relevant to the issues we needed to determine). Two other witness statements were provided by individuals who had resigned from their (former) positions as governors of St Wilfrid’s Catholic Primary School in Burgess Hill (which is now part of the Trust).

30. One person who provided a witness statement is an investigative journalist and they also gave evidence orally during the hearing.

31. All of the contents of the above were considered, as well as the oral submissions and evidence provided during the hearing, even if not directly referred to in this decision. The relevant legal principles The statutory framework General principles

32. Section 1(1) provides individuals with a general right of access to information held by public authorities. It provides: “ Any person making a request for information to a public authority is entitled— (a) to be informed in writing by the public authority whether it holds information of the description specified in the request, and (b) if that is the case, to have that information communicated to him. ”.

33. In essence, under section 1(1), a person who has requested information from a public authority is entitled to be informed in writing whether it holds that information. If the public authority does hold the requested information, that person is entitled to have that information communicated to them. However, those entitlements are subject to the other provisions of FOIA, including some exemptions and qualifications which may apply even if the requested information is held by the public authority. Section 1(2) provides: “ Subsection (1) has effect subject to the following provisions of this section and to the provisions of sections 2, 9, 12 and 14. ”.

34. Accordingly, section 1(1) does not provide an unconditional right to be told whether or not a public authority holds any information, nor an unconditional right of access to any information which a public authority does hold. The rights contained in that section are subject to certain other provisions of FOIA, including section 14. Section 14 – vexatious or repeated requests

35. Section 14(1) provides: “(1) Section 1(1) does not oblige a public authority to comply with a request for information if the request is vexatious. ”.

36. The term ‘vexatious’, used in section 14(1), is not defined in FOIA but has been interpreted by case law, to which we briefly refer below. Section 17 – refusal of request

37. Section 17(1) places a duty on a public authority to issue a refusal notice explaining why it has refused a request for information, within a specified time which is set out in section 10(1). Pursuant to section 10(1), the time limit is no later than 20 working days following the date of receipt of the request for information. Relevant case law We acknowledge the Practice Direction dated 4 June 2024 ( https://www.judiciary.uk/guidance-and-resources/practice-direction-from-the-senior-president-of-tribunals-reasons-for-decisions/ ) and particularly paragraph 9, which refers to the First-tier Tribunal not needing to specifically refer to relevant authorities. A ccordingly , we have not set out details of the applicable case law in our decision , save that we have found it helpful to summarise some relevant principles from, and to cite aspects of , case law ( Dransfield ) to illustrate and explain our considerations and conclusions .

38. We turn now to case law regarding the term ‘vexatious’ in section 14(1). As we have noted, it is not defined in FOIA but guidance on applying that term has been given in case law. We do not set out details of the case law but it is helpful to refer, in our discussions below, to the following four broad issues or themes which were identified in Dransfield as being of potential relevance when deciding whether a request is vexatious: a. the burden (on the public authority and its staff); b. the motive (of the requester); c. the value or serious purpose of the request; and d. any harassment or distress (of and to staff).

39. It is also important to note that it has been made clear that those four issues or themes are not exhaustive and are not intended to create a formulaic checklist and that a holistic approach needs to be taken in assessing whether a request is vexatious. It was stated by the Upper Tribunal in Dransfield that: “ …all the circumstances need to be considered in reaching what is ultimately a value judgement as to whether the request in issue is vexatious in the sense of being a disproportionate, manifestly unjustified, inappropriate or improper use of FOIA. ”.

40. Accordingly, the Tribunal should adopt a rounded approach, taking into account all the relevant factors, in order to reach a balanced conclusion as to whether a particular request is vexatious. Discussion and findings Preliminary points

41. We start by noting that the positions of both the Trust and the Commissioner were largely aligned, with the Commissioner having generally come to his conclusions in the Decision Notice based on information provided by the Trust during his investigation. Also, in his response to the appeal, the Commissioner generally relied on his findings in the Decision Notice and the Trust’s position in the appeal supported the conclusions reached in the Decision Notice.

42. Consequently, partly for convenience and partly because of the Trust’s representation in person at the hearing, the remainder of this decision generally refers only to the position or views of the Trust, but this should be taken as including reference to the Commissioner’s position or views to the extent applicable - and no disrespect to the Commissioner is intended by this approach. Scope of the appeal

43. In accordance with the remit of the Tribunal to which we have referred, the fundamental issue which we needed to determine in the appeal was whether the Commissioner was correct to conclude, in the Decision Notice, that the Request was vexatious under section 14(1).

44. We consider that it is important to stress what is outside of the scope of the appeal.

45. The Appellants made various allegations and/or referred to their previous complaints regarding the Trust, the School and certain staff members (including the School’s head teacher and the Trust’s Chief Executive).

46. As we noted in paragraph 22 (and summarised in paragraph 23), the scope of the Tribunal’s remit relates to the lawfulness of the Decision Notice. Any other issues are beyond the Tribunal’s powers to determine and fall outside of the scope of the appeal.

47. Consequently, t he appeal was not about any issues relating to any alleged failings, wrongdoing or impropriety of the School, the Trust or their staff. We have no jurisdiction to consider or determine any such issues and nothing we say in this decision should be taken as addressing any such issues or commenting on the merits of them.

48. Also, we consider that various aspects of the Appellants’ grounds of appeal are not relevant to the issue we needed to determine in the appeal. Consequently, we address below only pertinent material issues which were raised by the Appellants, as well as our assessment of the lawfulness of the Decision Notice in accordance with our remit.

49. We should also comment that, as we have noted, the Appellants disputed the factual accuracy of various aspects of the Decision Notice. In particular, the Appellants challenged the Commissioner’s view that they had misrepresented the findings of other bodies in their complaint to him. We identified that some aspects of the Decision Notice were factually incorrect but these were not material to our overall findings in the appeal. The nature and scope of the Request

50. We also consider that it is important to address the nature and scope of the Request. This is because the Appellants contended that, for the purposes of the appeal, the relevant request for information which they made to the Trust was not the Request but rather an earlier request made on 6 November 2023.

51. On 3 October 2023, the Appellants had sent (as part of ongoing correspondence) a letter of complaint to the Trust. Under cover of an email dated 24 October 2023, the Trust wrote to the Appellants setting out the Trust’s decision regarding that letter of complaint. In response to the Trust’s letter of 24 October 2023, the Appellants sent an email to the Chair of the Trust on 6 November 2023 which (amongst other things) contained the following: a. “ …you state, “The Trust Board, following its own review of the information you provided, judge that the complaint contained no new information, or referred to matters where information was not made available to the Trust…” Three questions arise; • How (and when) have the board reviewed this information? Please can you provide details. • Why does the complaint need new information for the Trust to consider the evidence within? • Which matters have we referred to where you do not already have the information? ”; and b. “ …please could you furnish us with the ‘assurances’ document submitted by [name redacted] ‘by the 19/10/23’ to the DfE per their request of 28/09/23. ”.

52. The Appellants’ position was that the above aspects of their email dated 6 November 2023 constituted a request for information which was the relevant request for the purposes of the appeal. In essence, the Appellants disputed that the Request was the relevant request. They considered that the earlier request for information was simply reworded when they later contacted the Trust (on 22 March 2024) because they had not received a response to it.

53. As we pointed out to the Appellants during the hearing, the Commissioner treated the Request (namely, the request for information dated 22 March 2024, as set out in paragraph 8) as the applicable request for information for the purposes of his investigation and the resulting Decision Notice. It is only the Request (and not the Appellants’ email to the Trust dated 6 November 2023) which was referred to in the Decision Notice.

54. We reiterate that the scope of the Tribunal’s remit relates to the lawfulness of the Decision Notice. As the Decision Notice only dealt with the Request, the appeal under section 57 and our jurisdiction under section 58 only extends to the Request (and no other request for information).

55. The Appellants informed the Commissioner of their email to the Trust dated 6 November 2023 when making their complaint under section 50. The Commissioner’s letter to the Appellants dated 30 January 2025 (acknowledging the complaint) referred to both the Request and one aspect of the Appellants’ request for information in their email of 6 November 2025. In that letter, the Commissioner treated them as two separate requests (referring to “ both requests ” and elsewhere referring to the “ requests ” in plural). We have no jurisdiction to consider the adequacy of the Commissioner’s investigation, including whether or not both of those requests should have resulted in a decision notice under section 50. Rather, as we have noted, our power only extends to assessment of the lawfulness of the Decision Notice which only covered the Request.

56. If the Appellants consider that the request for information dated 6 November 2023 has not been addressed then it is open to them to follow up on that accordingly. However, we have no jurisdiction to address that request for the reasons we have referred to. Whether the Request was vexatious

57. We turn now to the question of whether the Request was vexatious for the purposes of section 14(1).

58. The Trust’s position was that this was a case of ‘vexatiousness by drift’. Essentially, the Trust argued that the Request was vexatious because it formed part of a “ sprawling and persistent campaign waged by the Appellants ” which had drifted from any serious value or purpose. The Trust contended that the Request was being used to pursue an underlying grievance and was therefore an abuse of the FOIA regime.

59. In support of its position, the Trust referred to the background and chronology of dealings between the Appellants and the Trust (or the School). It argued that this demonstrated how the Request fits into the Appellants’ “ propensity to persistently make repetitive complaints ”.

60. In our opinion, consideration of all four of the broad themes outlined in Dransfield is helpful, as part of our broad assessment as to whether the Request was vexatious in all the circumstances. Whilst we have accordingly referred to those four themes below, we should stress that we have not been constrained or confined in any way by considering them. On the contrary, we have adopted a holistic approach, taking into account all of the relevant circumstances, and we have been mindful that the fundamental consideration was whether or not the Request was, essentially, a manifestly unjustified, inappropriate or improper use of FOIA.

61. Before turning to the themes outlined in Dransfield , we make some general observations. General observations

62. As we have noted, the Commissioner set out detailed comments in the Decision Notice regarding the DfE’s response to the Appellants’ complaint. The Decision Notice recorded the Commissioner’s view (in paragraph 15) that it was “ important ” to consider the DfE’s response “ in some detail ”. The Decision Notice accordingly set out details of the DfE’s response to the Appellants’ complaint, in paragraphs 16 to 31 (inclusive) of the Decision Notice. The Decision Notice then recorded (in paragraph 32) that the Commissioner had set out such details “ because of the influence it has had on subsequent events ”.

63. Similarly, paragraph 11 of the Decision Notice recorded that the Appellants had also raised concerns with Ofsted and the TRA and separate data protection concerns with the Commissioner.

64. It is clear from the Decision Notice (including the emphasis placed on the DfE’s investigation) that the involvement of other organisations in respect of the Appellants’ complaints was central to the Commissioner’s analysis and was significantly influential to his findings. Whilst we accept that the involvement of the DfE (and other organisations) has some relevance to the Dransfield themes of ‘motive’ and the ‘value or serious purpose’ of the Request (which we address below), we consider that the Commissioner placed too much weight on the outcome of the DfE complaint in the Decision Notice.

65. We were surprised to see the Commissioner refer, in paragraphs 51 and 53 of the Decision Notice respectively, to the use of a staff member’s personal email address to process the Appellants’ personal data as, essentially, “ poor practice ”. Whilst matters relating to the Trust’s data protection compliance are outside of our jurisdiction in the appeal, we nevertheless set out our brief observations on this point because it was addressed in the Decision Notice and was taken into account by the Commissioner in reaching his conclusions. If it was the case (as appears to have been stated by the Commissioner in the Decision Notice) that an unauthorised third-party organisation was used to process the Appellants’ personal data then that would appear to be a clear personal data breach, rather than mere ‘poor practice’. It would also be immaterial that (as stated in paragraph 51 of the Decision Notice) the personal data was “ disclosed in response to a SAR anyway ”. Consequently we would also disagree with the Commissioner’s assessment, in paragraphs 51 and 52 of the Decision Notice, that the Appellants were ‘mischaracterising’ that personal data breach as ‘wrongdoing’. Burden

66. As we have noted, the Decision Notice referred to 11 items of correspondence being sent by the Appellants over a two-year period and the Commissioner considered that this did not represent an intolerable burden. The 11 items of correspondence were identified in the open bundle. The first involved the Appellants sending information to the Trust regarding their allegations of misconduct and dishonesty by the head teacher of the School. Of the other items, we find that, in summary: a. four were addressing matters following up to those initial allegations (and two of those were relating to arrangements for a hearing date); b. two were related to a Subject Access Request; c. four were related to the requests for information under FOIA. The first of those was the email dated 6 November 2023 (which, as noted above, the Appellants contended was the relevant request for the purposes of the appeal). The second of those was a follow-up to that request. The third of those was to notify the Trust that the Appellants were opening a case with the Commissioner regarding the Trust’s failure to respond. The fourth of those included the Request (which the Appellants viewed as simply a ‘follow-up’ to the initial request, as we have noted).

67. We consider (as did the Commissioner, essentially) that the 11 items of correspondence did not constitute a significant burden on the Trust. Indeed, in our view the items related to the Appellants’ Subject Access Request should not be taken into account in assessing the burden on the Trust, on the basis that the exercise of a Subject Access Request is a separate statutory right. In respect of the four FOIA-related items, discounting the Request itself, there was only one earlier request for information which was then ‘chased’ by the Appellants and subsequently they notified the Trust that they were complaining to the Commissioner.

68. The Commissioner commented that responding to some of the individual items of correspondence would have required a considerable amount of work. However, in our view, having regard to the nature of the 11 items of correspondence we have outlined, these are not indicative of any desire by the Appellants to unduly burden or disrupt the Trust. More than half related to Subject Access Requests and requests for information under FOIA. In respect of the four items regarding the latter, these comprised only two requests (although the Appellants considered was just one) with the other two items relevant to the Trust’s lack of response.

69. Whilst the Commissioner stated in the Decision Notice that the figure of 11 items of correspondence seemed to exclude correspondence sent directly to the School, no other items of correspondence were specifically cited by the Commissioner (or the Trust) as applicable to the theme of burden.

70. We also find that the Request was targeted and narrow in its scope. We consider that the Request itself would not create any material burden for the Trust.

71. The Commissioner considered, however (as we have noted), that dealing with the Appellants’ direct correspondence only represented part of the burden on the Trust. The Commissioner’s view (in paragraphs 46 and 47 of the Decision Notice) was that the involvement of four external organisations would have placed an additional burden on the Trust “ in terms of preparing its submission and responding to any follow-up queries ”.

72. As we comment further below, we disagree with the Commissioner’s view that four organisations were involved. In any event, in our view, it was inappropriate to attach weight to the fact that the Appellants had involved other organisations in assessing the burden on the Trust. The Appellants were legitimately entitled to raise a complaint (regardless of the merits of any such complaint) and we consider that doing so should not count against them in the context of evaluating whether the Request was vexatious.

73. In addition, as the Commissioner indirectly accepted, the involvement of the TRA occurred after the statutory deadline for the Trust to respond to the Request. Accordingly, it was wrong of the Commissioner to include their subsequent involvement for the purposes of assessing whether the Request was vexatious.

74. Moreover, the Commissioner included himself when counting the organisations involved. We also consider that it was inappropriate to do so in evaluating the burden of the Request. Otherwise, in any case when a public authority cited section 14(1) in response to a request for information then any subsequent complaint made to the Commissioner could be taken into account as part of the Commissioner assessing the burden on that public authority. That cannot be right. We recognise that in this case there were separate complaints also made to the Commissioner regarding matters other than the Request, but in our view the principle is the same; raising a complaint with the Commissioner (or other third-party organisation) should not be given weight in assessing the burden of a request for information.

75. The Trust argued that the Request is misconceived, on the basis that its letter of 20 October 2023 did not say that the Trust had carried out an investigation but rather that (in essence) the Appellants’ complaint had not been investigated because other organisations had carried out their own investigations. The Trust’s position, therefore, was that the Commissioner correctly concluded (in paragraph 36 of the Decision Notice) that the letter “ makes clear that no further internal investigation had been carried out and it did not intend to carry one out… ” and accordingly that the Request had no practical utility.

76. We would make three comments in respect of the points in the preceding paragraph. First, the thrust of the Trust’s argument is essentially that the Request was seeking information which did not exist. However, if that were the case then the Trust could have easily and readily responded to it saying as such, rather than citing section 14(1) and then refusing to undertake an internal review. It also counters, to an extent, the Trust’s arguments regarding the burden of the Request.

77. Secondly – and linked to the preceding point - as we have noted, there was a closed bundle which contained information which was relevant to the Request and, in particular, to the question of whether information within the scope of the Request may be held. The Trust’s argument that, in essence, there cannot be any information relevant to the Request is therefore plainly misconceived.

78. Thirdly (and more pertinently), we consider that this reflects a mischaracterisation of the Request. The Trust’s letter of 20 October 2023 stated that it considered the Appellants’ complaint to have been “ fully investigated ” and in giving its reasons for that view stated that it had undertaken “ its own review ” of information provided by the Appellants. The Request then asked for “… all documents showing this investigation took place, its deliberations and findings… ” and it specifically stated that this was to include “ meeting minutes ”. Therefore the Request was evidently seeking information relating to the Trust’s own review, in addition to any documents held by the Trust relating to the other organisations’ investigations and/or its own investigation.

79. It follows that we reject the Trust’s arguments (and the Commissioner’s views) set out in paragraph 75.

80. A further argument of the Trust regarding burden was that the Request formed part of a wider campaign by the Appellants. Essentially, the Trust’s position was that each interaction with the Appellants resulted in a further one. The Trust argued, in essence, that the ongoing correspondence with the Appellants would not end by responding to the Request and that it was therefore entitled to refuse it as vexatious. A related point was the potential future burden which would be created if the Trust responded to the Request.

81. The Appellants denied that there was a campaign against the Trust and that responding to the Request would spur further requests for information. They stated that they had not entered into correspondence with the Trust since the date of the Request (other than in connection with the appeal) and had only made one request for information to it. They also stated that they had no intention of pursuing further requests. In essence, they stated that they had accepted the outcomes of the third-party investigations but simply wanted to know how those outcomes had been dealt with by the Trust.

82. As we have noted, given that the Request differs from the earlier request made by the Appellants on 6 November 2023, there has been more than one request for information. However, having regard to our points above regarding their 11 items of correspondence with the Trust and regarding the involvement of other organisations, we consider that (in all the circumstances) there was no relevant ‘campaign’ to support the view that the Request was vexatious. We also do not accept the Trust’s arguments about the potential future burden, for similar reasons.

83. For all of the reasons we have given, we conclude that there was no material burden associated with the Request. Motive

84. The question of motive is usually connected, to some degree, with the inherent value or purpose of a request for information. In this case, we find that those themes are intrinsically connected and we address further below the issue of the purpose or value of the Request.

85. In short, we consider that there was a valid motive behind the Request (linked to our comments below regarding the purpose or value of the Request). We accept the Appellants’ arguments that the Request was related to their concerns about transparency regarding how the Trust dealt with the outcomes of the third-party investigations regarding their complaints. We reiterate that the merits of the Appellant’s complaints and allegations are not relevant for current purposes. However, we find that the Appellants had a genuine motivation in making the Request. Value or serious purpose

86. The Trust’s position was that there was very little public value in the Request. In part, this was linked to the Trust’s arguments that the Request had no practical utility (which we have addressed above). The Trust also considered that this was because the Appellants’ complaints had been comprehensively investigated by other organisations.

87. The Commissioner accepted (in paragraph 63 of the Decision Notice) that there was some public value “ in holding individuals in senior positions to account ”. Essentially, the Commissioner recognised that there was some value or serious purpose behind the Request, but the Commissioner’s position was that this was undermined by other factors (including points we address below from paragraph 64 of the Decision Notice).

88. The Trust argued that the Appellants’ complaints had been considered by at least four independent organisations; namely, the DfE, Ofsted, the Commissioner and the TRA. As we have mentioned, the TRA’s involvement post-dated the statutory deadline for responding to the Request, and we consider that it was inappropriate to take into account the Commissioner’s involvement for the purposes of assessing whether the Request was vexatious.

89. Whilst we therefore disagree with the Trust’s contention that at least four independent organisations had considered the Appellants’ complaints, we recognise that there was some involvement of independent organisations – particularly the DfE. In that regard, we accept the Trust’s argument that the DfE was an appropriate body with relevant competencies and responsibilities, and had investigated the Appellants’ complaints following appropriate procedures. Indeed, the Appellants also stated that they accepted the DfE’s findings (albeit they considered that it had a limited remit). The Trust accordingly asserted that this substantially satisfied the public interest in oversight and accountability in relation to the Trust (or the School) and its governance.

90. In a similar vein, the Trust argued that there was no ‘accountability deficit’ which would be addressed by responding to the Request because, essentially, the Appellants’ complaints had already been investigated. The Trust also argued that, in essence, the public interest or value in transparency was diminished if it had been met by other means.

91. Bodies with regulatory or investigatory powers typically have specific, limited, remits and their roles can vary. Likewise, a matter being investigated can have a particular focus. In other words, different avenues for investigating complaints can serve different purposes and have different remedies. Therefore, even where a body finds that there was no wrongdoing having conducted an investigation, it does not necessarily follow that there is little or no public interest in the relevant subject matter. We consider that this is particularly so in the context of an assessment of the value of a request for information under FOIA (whether as part of a public interest test or as part of an overall assessment of a request being vexatious).

92. Accordingly, in our view (whilst recognising that each case turns on its facts) there could be scenarios where there is a strong public interest in disclosure of information despite, or indeed simply because of, the fact that there have been investigations which have found no wrongdoing.

93. In this case, we consider that the involvement of other organisations (regardless of their views on the merits of the Appellants’ complaints), together with the witness evidence, signifies a wider public interest which goes to the value and purpose of the Request and militates against a finding that it was vexatious. Other related factors relevant to the public interest, or the serious value and purpose of the Request, are that ultimately the concerns of the Appellants and the witnesses relate to the welfare of children and, given the nature of the Trust, involving more than one school.

94. Further, in this case, as the Trust itself accepted, the third-party investigations did not find that all aspects of the Appellants’ complaints lacked merit and the Trust (or the School) was criticised or cautioned in relation to its conduct. This is part of the reason why we consider that it was reasonable for the Appellants to want to understand what the Trust had done about the outcomes of those investigations. We consider that this also demonstrated that there was a serious value or purpose in the Request. This also links to our views that there was genuine motivation behind the Request.

95. As we have noted, the Decision Notice set out details of the DfE’s response to the Appellants’ complaint, events subsequent to that and matters which the Commissioner considered had been misrepresented by the Appellants regarding the findings of other bodies – and we accept that, in considering all of the circumstances, it was appropriate to take those into account. However, as also noted, we consider that the Commissioner placed too much weight on those issues in reaching his decision. In total, the details of the DfE’s response, the subsequent events and matters which the Commissioner considered had been misrepresented by the Appellants comprised a significant proportion of the Decision Notice.

96. In any event, we consider that issues relating to the involvement of other organisations should not be a material factor in assessing whether a request is vexatious, for the reasons we have already given.

97. We do not accept the Trust’s argument that this is case of ‘vexatiousness by drift’. We find that the Request can be differentiated from the Appellants’ original complaint, in that (as noted in paragraph 77) the Request was seeking information relating to the Trust’s own review of information (in addition to other things) . Consequently, we find that this is not a case where the Request reflects an ongoing reiteration of a grievance which has been exhaustively considered and addressed in previous information requests.

98. Similarly, we consider that the Commissioner wrongly characterised the Request, in paragraph 64 of the Decision Notice, as drifting away from holding the Trust to account for a decision it had made “ towards a campaign to “prove” dishonesty in a way that is becoming increasingly personal toward the head teacher ”. As we have noted, the Request was, essentially, seeking information regarding the Trust’s review of certain information, including relating to other organisations’ investigations. We also consider that it was clear from the Request that the Appellants wanted to know how the Trust dealt with the outcomes of the third-party investigations . We therefore disagree with the Commissioner’s view that this was related to proving dishonesty on the part of the Trust or was targeted at the head teacher personally.

99. We also disagree with the Commissioner’s statement in paragraph 64 of the Decision Notice that there would be a lack of information likely to result from the Request, other than information previously provided by the Appellants. Again, this is a mischaracterisation of the Request because it was evidently not seeking information which the Appellants already had, for the reasons we have referred to.

100. For all the reasons we have given, we therefore find that there was a serious purpose or value to the Request. Harassment or distress

101. It was not asserted by the Commissioner or the Trust that the Appellants had used offensive or threatening language in their dealings with the Trust and the School, and we saw no use of any inappropriate language on the part of the Appellants. Whilst part of the Appellants’ complaints were directed at the School’s head teacher and the Trust’s Chief Executive, and (as we have noted) the Commissioner considered that the Appellants were engaged in a campaign that was becoming personal toward the School’s head teacher, there was no evidence before us that any individuals were harassed or distressed as a result of the Appellants’ complaints or their other correspondence.

102. We therefore find that there was no harassment of, or distress to, any individuals in connection with the Request or the Appellants’ wider dealings with the Trust. Summary

103. Taking into account all of the circumstances, for all of the above reasons, we consider that the Request did not constitute a disproportionate and inappropriate use of FOIA and accordingly we find that the Request was not vexatious for the purposes of section 14(1). Other matters – section 17(1)

104. As we have noted: a. the Request was dated 22 March 2024 ; b. the Trust only responded to the Request (issuing its refusal notice) on 24 May 2024 ; and c. pursuant to section 17(1) and section 10(1), the Trust was obliged to issue its refusal notice no later than 20 working days following the date of receipt of the Request.

105. Given the Trust’s delay in responding to the Request, we agree with the conclusion of the Commissioner in the Decision Notice that the Trust breached section 17(1). Final conclusions

106. For all of the reasons we have given, we find that the Decision Notice involved an error of law in concluding that the Trust was entitled to refuse the Request pursuant to section 14(1).

107. We therefore allow the appeal and we make the Substituted Decision Notice as set out above.

108. We should briefly comment that the Appellants sought an order from the Tribunal for disclosure of the information they had requested, on the basis that that the Trust did not rely on any other FOIA exemptions at the time of its refusal of the Request. However, as section 14(1) had been relied on by the Trust it would not have been appropriate for it to rely on other exemptions. In respect of the appeal, the Trust reserved its position regarding potential reliance on other exemptions and accordingly it is not appropriate for us to order disclosure of information, but rather a fresh response in accordance with the terms of our Substituted Decision Notice. Signed: Stephen Roper Date: 31 December 2025 Judge of the First-tier Tribunal