UK case law

Rennie & Partners Ltd v London Borough of Barnet

[2026] UKFTT GRC 381 · First-tier Tribunal (General Regulatory Chamber) – Standards & Licensing · 2026

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The verbatim text of this UK judgment. Sourced directly from The National Archives Find Case Law. Not an AI summary, not a paraphrase — every word below is the original ruling, under Crown copyright and the Open Government Licence v3.0.

Full judgment

33. I consider the covering letters' lack of formal letter-head, apparent departure from the Council template, spelling mistakes, and in the case of the FN covering letter incorrect date, as well as the FN attaching an extract of an inapplicable Regulation - while not major errors even collectively - are not only "confusing" for the recipient but also indicative of a general lack of precision and professionalism on the part of the Council in applying the Regulations. This ill-befits a local authority tasked with enforcing the very same Regulations (albeit different provisions) against local businesses.

34. I note the Council's explanation that its relatively rare exercise of the Regulations' enforcement powers means it is not well "set up" to deal with such cases but I do not regard that as an acceptable excuse for failing to meet the procedural requirements specified in the Schedule to the Regulations.

35. I accept the Council's submission that paragraph 3(4)(c) of that Schedule does not prescribe the exact detail that must be included within the "information about how to pay the penalty". However, in this case, I consider that the payment information actually included in the FN was at best incomplete - because it clearly intended to state a reference number but did not - and at worst failed to give information about "how" to pay the penalty, merely providing a telephone number to call in order to find out how (e.g. by what methods) payment could be made.

36. I also accept that the deficiencies in information in the FN itself could, in this case, with a little extra effort and inquiry on the part of the recipient, have been discovered. However, I consider that is beside the point. Requiring the recipient of a notice to look elsewhere - such as a covering letter to find the relevant reference or guess at the relevant address for the payee, or by telephoning the local authority to speak to someone at their contact centre to find out how to pay - in my view derogates from the statutory design of paragraph 3(4).

37. In my judgment, the purpose of paragraph 3(4)'s list of requirements that "must" be set out in the final notice is intended to ensure that a final notice is a self-contained document which provides the recipient with all the information they need in order to understand the amount of the penalty; why it has been imposed; how to pay it and by when; how to appeal; and the consequences of failing to comply.

38. Crucially in this case, in my judgment, the FN did not contain even - to paraphrase Mr Schultz's words - a "restrictive" method of payment. Instead, it stated a general Council telephone which leads to a recorded message giving a series of options to various Council services, none of which is related to penalty payments under the Regulation. Had the recipient been patient enough to wait till the end of the recording and speak to someone at the Council's Contact Centre, at best (had they been able to provide a reference - which was not stated in the FN itself but only in the wrongly dated covering letter - or other identifying information) they would presumably have been given details about how to pay.

39. In my view, this is insufficient to meet the requirement in the Schedule to the Regulations paragraph 3(4), sub-paragraph (c) that the final notice must set out "information about how to pay the penalty". CONCLUSION

40. As a result of my finding that the FN falls short of the full requirements set out in paragraph 3(4) of the Schedule to the Regulations, I consider the FN is defective. I therefore quash it and the penalty it imposes.

41. As my conclusion on this preliminary issue disposes of the appeal in this case, I did not go on to determine the parties' other evidence, arguments and submissions. Signed: Judge A. Marks CBE Dated: 11 March 2026