Paul Kerridge v June Diana Hook

Introduction

1. This dispute, referred to the First-tier Tribunal by the Land Registry on 19 March 2024, arises out of an application to the Land Registry made by the Applicant, Paul Kerridge, to be registered as proprietor of a field on the west side of Mill, Street, Stowupland, Stowmarket (“the Field”). The Field is registered under title number SK150343 and its registered proprietor is the Respondent, June Diana Hook. The Respondent is the Applicant’s mother.

2. The application, on form ADV1, was made on 19 November 2021 on the basis that the Applicant had been in adverse possession of the field for more that 10 years and that the Applicant was entitled to the Field under the will of Robert Dennis Kerridge (“Bob”). Bob, who died on 6 November 1999, was the Respondent’s husband and the Applicant’s stepfather.

3. The Respondent objected to the application. Her case is that the Applicant has not been in adverse possession of the Field but did look after it with her permission for some years, and that the field was not left to the Applicant under Bob’s will.

4. The dispute came before me at a hearing held at Triton House, Bury St Edmunds, Suffolk on 3 and 4 June 2025. I held a site visit on 2 June 2025. The Applicant appeared in person with the assistance of his wife, Sally Kerridge (“Sally”). The Respondent was represented by Rupert Myers of counsel instructed by Jackamans, Solicitors.

5. As this application was made under Schedule 6 to the Land Registration Act 2002 , the Applicant has to show (1) 10 years of adverse possession continuing until the application was made and (2) that one of the 3 conditions in paragraph 5 to Schedule 6 was met (the Respondent having required the application to be dealt with under paragraph 5, pursuant paragraph 3 of Schedule 6).

6. It was common ground that the third condition under Schedule 6 had no application here. Prior to the hearing, the Applicant’s case was understood by the Respondent (and by me from my pre-hearing reading) to rest on the second condition: that the applicant is for some other reason entitled to be registered as the proprietor of the estate. The basis of that case was the Applicant’s contention that the Field had been left to him in Bob’s will. At the beginning of the hearing it became apparent that the Applicant might also be seeking to rely on the first condition: it would be unconscionable because of an equity by estoppel for the registered proprietor to seek to dispossess the applicant and the circumstances are such that the applicant ought to be registered as the proprietor. The suggestion being raised by the Applicant was that there was an assurance of entitlement to the Field made by Bob during his lifetime on which the Applicant had relied.

7. The Respondent objected to the Applicant advancing a case based on equitable estoppel because it had not been raised in the Applicant’s statement of case (indeed, it had not been). I explained to the Applicant that if he wished to run an equitable estoppel case under paragraph 5 in the alternative to his case based on the will, he would have to apply for permission to amend his statement of case and that if I were to grant permission to amend, it would likely require the hearing to be adjourned and further witness evidence to be filed; I also explained that in the normal course of events the costs of the adjournment would probably fall on the Applicant as an incident of the grant of permission to amend. The Applicant informed me that he did not wish to apply for permission to amend his statement of case in those circumstances. I therefore ruled that the only condition under paragraph 5 which he could rely on at the hearing was the second ground, some other reason, on the premise that the Field was left to him in Bob’s will. The background to the application

8. The Respondent and Bob married in 1978. The Applicant was the Respondent’s, then only, child by a different husband, Keith Hewitt, and was then about 1 year’s old. The Respondent and Bob had two sons together, Tom Kerridge (“Tom”) and Adam Kerridge (“Adam”). The Applicant was brought up with Tom and Adam as one of the family and changed his surname to Kerridge by deed poll when in his teens.

9. Bob was a farmer by occupation. His main income was made by contracting for other farmers but he also held a tenancy of a smallholding known as Ashes Farm, Newton Road, Stowmarket (“Ashes Farm”) and of another smallholding at Water Run Farm and Bacton Road, Haughley (“the Haughley Smallholding”). Bob was a sole trader under the trading name, Ashes Farming Co.

10. In 1995 Bob and the Respondent purchased land and buildings know as Mill Green Farm, Stowupland, Stowmarket, Suffolk to occupy as their home. It consisted of a farmhouse with a front and rear garden and, adjoining the garden’s southern and western boundaries, a field (the Field). The Field is irregularly shaped and open to Mill Street, the public highway on its eastern boundary.

11. Bob, the Respondent, Tom and Adam continued to live at Mill Green Farm until Bob’s death on 6 November 1999. The Applicant was no longer living with Bob and the Respondent by then. The Respondent, Tom and Adam carried on living there for two more years after Bob’s death until, in 2001, the Respondent sold the farmhouse (and garden) to a Terry Featherstone, retaining only the Field. In 2014 Mr Featherstone sold the farmhouse to its current owner, and occupier, Robert Radley.

12. When Bob and the Respondent bought Mill Green Farm they did so in their joint names. The parties were unable at the date of the hearing to establish definitively whether Bob and the Respondent purchased it as beneficial joint tenants or as beneficial tenants in common. The Respondent did not know or recall, herself, and neither the 1995 transfer nor any other document containing a declaration of trust was available. However, a partial copy of the proprietorship register for Mill Green Farm prior to Bob’s death was in the bundle and it showed that the register contained a Form A restriction preventing a disposition by a sole proprietor under which capital money arises from being registered. Normally, the Land Registry will place a Form A restriction on land owned by more than one person where it understands that the beneficial interest in the property is held as tenants in common but not when the Land Registry understands it to be held as beneficial joint tenants. So, it appears that the Land Registry was not satisfied that Mill Street Farm was owned by the Respondent and Bob as beneficial joint tenants when their purchase was registered in April 1995.

13. On that basis, the parties’ assumption was that Mill Green Farm was acquired by Bob and the Respondent as beneficial tenants in common in equal shares. I will make the same assumption for the purposes of this decision, since neither party sought to establish that it was acquired as beneficial joint owners despite the Form A restriction, nor as tenants in common in unequal shares. Beneficial ownership follows legal ownership in the absence of evidence to the contrary.

14. Sadly, Bob was only 46 year old when he died of lung cancer. He had, apparently, become increasingly ill during the year leading up to his death and became unable to continue with his contracting business. So in June 1999 he auctioned off the equipment used for contracting.

15. In September 1999 Bob and the Respondent instructed Gudgeons Solicitors to prepare new wills for each of them. The hearing bundle contains a copy letter dated 5 October 1999 addressed to Bob and the Respondent enclosing draft wills, referring to a meeting with the Respondent the previous week and a telephone conversation with Bob and the Respondent on the previous day. Gudgeons had also acted on the purchase of Mill Green Farm.

16. Bob signed his will on 14 October 1999 (“the Will”). It differed slightly from the version sent in draft under the 5 October 1999 letter. The Will appointed the Respondent as Bob’s sole executrix. It devised Bob’s whole residuary estate to the Respondent and made the following gift to the Applicant: “(1) I GIVE to Paul my tenancy of Ashes Farm Newton Road Stowmarket and the assets of the farming business carried on by me thereat including agricultural equipment book debts growing crops milk quota and the money (if any) standing to the credit of my farm current account but excluding any motor car and subject to all debts and liabilities of my said business at my death and for the purposes of Part IV of the Agricultural Holdings Act 1986 I designate Paul as the person whom I desire to succeed me as tenant of the said holding (2) IF the foregoing gift to Paul takes effect and there is any Inheritance Tax payable on my estate by reason of my death which is attributable to the foregoing gift (after allowing for any reduction in value for Inheritance Tax purposes which is attributed thereto) then such gift shall be subject to such Inheritance Tax and it shall be borne by Paul in exoneration of the rest of my estate.”

17. The Will provided that if the Respondent should predecease Bob then (1) the residuary estate should be shared equally between the Applicant, Tom and Adam and (2) Tom and Adam should each have gifts of £10,000.

18. The Gudgeons letter of 5 October 1999 refers to the £10,000 gifts as “equalising legacies” showing that they were meant to correspond to the gift of the Ashes Farm tenancy and the assets of the faming business to the Applicant. It is apparent from the letter that in the draft will initially prepared by Gudgeons the £10,000 gifts were to be made even if the Respondent were to survive Bob. I was told that was changed because there was not enough cash in the estate to make the gifts without putting the Respondent in difficulties in retaining Mill Green Farm.

19. It was the Applicant’s and Sally’s evidence, denied by the Respondent, that shortly before his death, the Applicant and Sally had a meeting with Bob, at which the Respondent was present, in which Bob said he would be leaving the Applicant his agricultural land, including the Field, as part of the business which he was leaving to the Applicant.

20. In due course, probate was granted to the Respondent, the Mill Green Farm farmhouse was sold and the Field was registered in the Respondent’s sole name, both following an assent made on 16 October 2000.

21. The Applicant was able to obtain the grant of tenancies of Ashes Farm and the Haughley Smallholding and farmed them under the trading name, Ashes Farming Co., the same trading name as Bob had used for his farming and contracting business. Some years later he was able to arrange to surrender half of the land held under the Ashes Farm tenancy for a fairly substantial payment and some land which he is presently redeveloping.

22. Following Bob’s death, the Applicant took on the management of the Field – he says because it was left to him in Bob’s will and the Respondent says by arrangement with her and with her permission.

23. The Applicant does not appear to have done a huge amount with the Field himself. It was cropped for a few years but then he claimed set aside payments in respect of it for some years. On his evidence he would have topped it once a year in the years when it was the subject of a set aside claim. The Applicant arranged to let the Field out to another farmer, Mr Porch, for a number of years. There was some confusion about which years and there were no documents available to resolve the confusion, but it is likely that it was let out from about 2009 to 2017.

24. Sadly, at some point between 2015 and 2017 the formerly good relationship between the Respondent and the Applicant broke down. The hearing bundle contains some quite unpleasant correspondence between them dating back to August 2017.

25. On 20 September 2019, the Respondent sent the Applicant an email that read as follows: “Dear Paul I was shocked to find you have been working on my land. You gave it up when you told me you were not paying me back the money I lent to you and I accepted it. Last year my Solicitor wrote to you and asked for the documentation to be sent to me, which you ignored. I want to know why you are working on it when you no longer have the use of it. What exactly are you doing there? This is especially surprising after receiving your reply to my email when you made it clear you want nothing to do with me or the family. I have spoken to my Solicitor and you have no right to be there. Please terminate your use of my land forthwith so I can make my own arrangements. Thanking you. Mum”

26. The Applicant’s evidence was that after receiving that email, he gave up his plans to cultivate the Field and has made no use of it since then. However, he did employ Jonathan Creighton, someone who had worked for him from time to time between 2015 and 2022, to carry out some works to repair a drainage pipe in the Field in 2021. Mr Creighton gave evidence and said that he spent 3 to 5 days carrying out that work and had previously spent about a day a year working on the Field. I accept Mr Creighton’s evidence about that albeit that it is unlikely he did any work on the field before 2017 as it was probably let to Mr Porch until then.

27. When I viewed the Field at the site visit it was overgrown except for a strip running down the side of Mill Green Farm and its gardens. It was common ground that this strip was mowed by Robert Radley, the owner of Mill Green Farm. He said – and this was not challenged – that he began mowing that strip to protect his own land from overgrowth on the Field after asking the Respondent for permission to do so. In his witness statement he said that he began doing so “a while ago”. He was not cross examined and the date when he began keeping that strip clear was not clarified before me.

28. As mentioned above, this application for adverse possession was made in November 2021. The issues

29. In order to succeed in his application under Sch. 6 to the 2002 Act , the Applicant needs to prove the following: (1) he had been in adverse possession of the Field – factual possession with an intention to possess – for a continuous period of at least 10 years continuing until the date of his application to the Land Registry, and not by the Respondent’s permission, and (2) he satisfies the second condition under paragraph 5 of Schedule 6 because the Field was left to him in Bob’s will. Adverse possession The law

30. It is long established that adverse possession has two components: factual possession and an intention to possess. In Megarry and Wade on the Law of Real Property (10 th edition), the following description of factual possession is given at [7-030] to ]7-031]: “(a) Factual possession. “Possession is a legal concept which depends on the performance of overt acts”. For a squatter, S, to prove factual possession, S must show that: (i) she had an appropriate degree of physical control of the land; (ii) her possession was a single possession: there can be a single possession by several squatters jointly, but not severally; (iii) her possession was exclusive—a squatter cannot be in possession at the same time as the dispossessed owner; and (iv) she dealt with the land in question as an occupying owner might have been expected to deal with it and no-one else has done. Whether the squatter has taken a sufficient degree of control is a matter of fact, depending on all the circumstances, in particular the nature of the land and the manner in which such land is commonly enjoyed. Some act of entry onto (or over) the land appears essential, but “The type of conduct which indicates possession must vary with the type of land.” In the case of open land, absolute physical control is normally impracticable The fact that neighbours and others may pass over open land does not, therefore, preclude factual possession from being established where the nature of the land is such that it would not be possible to prevent them from doing so.”

31. The House of Lords in JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419 approved a passage from the judgment of Slade J in Powell v McFarlane (1977) 38 PC & R 452 at 470-1, which was as follows: “Factual possession signifies an appropriate degree of physical control. It must be a single and [exclusive] possession, though there can be a single possession exercised by or on behalf of several persons jointly. Thus an owner of land and a person intruding on that land without his consent cannot both be in possession of the land at the same time. The question what acts constitute a sufficient degree of exclusive physical control must depend on the circumstances, in particular the nature of the land and the manner in which land of that nature is commonly used or enjoyed … Everything must depend on the particular circumstances, but broadly, I think what must be shown as constituting factual possession is that the alleged possessor has been dealing with the land in question as an occupying owner might have been expected to deal with it and that no-one else has done so."

32. Possession can be vicarious through a licensee or tenant of the squatter: Malik v Malik [2019] EWHC 1843 (Ch) . If, however, the possession of the squatter is with the permission of the person with legal title (“the paper owner”), it cannot be adverse: Moses v Lovegrove [1952] 2 Q.B. 533 at 540. Possession with permission is to be contrasted with possession in which the paper owner acquiesces, but without a grant of permission; that can be adverse.

33. Adverse possession once taken can be lost. In Markfield Investments v Evans [2001] 1 WLR 1321 Simon Brown LJ observed at [12] that: “Adverse possession may cease (a) by the occupier vacating the premises, (b) by the occupier giving a written acknowledgment of the true owner's title (see sections 29 and 30 of the 1980 Act), (c) by the true owner's grant of a tenancy or licence to the occupier (even a unilateral licence: see BP Properties Ltd v Buckler (1987) 55 P & CR 337), or (d) by the true owner physically re-entering upon the land.”

34. In Zarb v Parry [2011] EWCA Civ 1306 the Court of Appeal held that for the paper owner to bring a squatter’s adverse possession to an end by retaking possession, the paper title owner has to resume possession for at least a short time. Oral declarations in the form of notices and the like are not sufficient if the squatter has not gone out of possession. That is not to say that the squatter’s possession cannot come to an end in response to an oral communication by the squatter electing to go out of possession and vacating the property.

35. In relation to registered land, unless there had been a complete 12-year period of adverse possession by the date when the Land Registration Act 2002 came into force in October 2003, a claim to adverse possession is governed by Schedule 6 to the 2002 Act . By para. 1 of that Schedule, an applicant for adverse possession must have “been in adverse possession of the estate for the period of ten years ending on the date of the application.” Insofar as relevant, para. 5 of Sch. 6 reads: “(1) If an application under paragraph 1 is required to be dealt with under this paragraph [this application was so required by the Respondent], the applicant is only entitled to be registered as the new proprietor of the estate if any of the following conditions is met. (2) The first condition is that— (a) it would be unconscionable because of an equity by estoppel for the registered proprietor to seek to dispossess the applicant, and (b) the circumstances are such that the applicant ought to be registered as the proprietor. (3) The second condition is that the applicant is for some other reason entitled to be registered as the proprietor of the estate. (4) The third condition is that— (a) the land to which the application relates is adjacent to land belonging to the applicant, (b) the exact line of the boundary between the two has not been determined under rules under section 60, (c) for at least ten years of the period of adverse possession ending on the date of the application, the applicant (or any predecessor in title) reasonably believed that the land to which the application relates belonged to him, and (d) the estate to which the application relates was registered more than one year prior to the date of the application.” Discussion

36. I am satisfied that for a period of time after Bob’s death the Applicant had sole use of the field, directly or vicariously through Mr Porch. Absent any other considerations, the growing of crops on the field by the Applicant or his tenant/licensee, Mr Porch, would be capable of amounting to factual possession of the Field, in my judgment. While claiming set aside payments may not be sufficient on their own, since they are not an activity on the ground that would be apparent to the paper owner, claiming set aside for a period between two period of growing crops on the field (one period directly and one through a tenant) would probably be a sufficient continuation of possession established by the growing of crops. On the evidence I was satisfied that the Applicant grew crops on the Field for a couple of years after Bob’s death, then claimed set aside payments in respect of it, then let it out to Mr Porch for several years ending in 2016 or 2017.

37. However, the real questions on this aspect of the dispute are: (1) whether the Applicant ever went into adverse possession or whether he had the use of the Field with the permission of the Respondent; (2) related to (1), whether he intended to possess the Field, or merely look after it for the Respondent while taking any income from it while he was doing so with the Respondent’s consent; if the Applicant did go into adverse possession of the Field, whether the Applicant was still in adverse possession when he made his application to the Land Registry in November 2021.

38. I heard evidence on behalf of the Applicant from the Applicant himself, his wife, Sally, Jonathan Creighton whom I mentioned above and James Bevan. I also read witness statements made by Keith Hewitt and Caroline Freeman both of whom were available to give oral evidence but not required to do so because Mr Myers did not have any questions for them.

39. I accept the evidence in the statements of Mr Hewitt and Mrs Freeman but their evidence does not assist me on the issues in the case. Nor did Mr Bevan’s although I have no doubt that he was an honest and reliable witness. Mr Creighton gave the impression of being an honest witness seeking to assist the Tribunal and I have no reason to doubt the truth of what he said, the relevant aspects of which I have already described.

40. On behalf of the Respondent I heard evidence from the Respondent herself, Tom, Robert Radley and John Phillips, the Respondent’s accountant.

41. I did not find Mr Phillips’ evidence helpful. In reality it was expert evidence commenting on Bob’s farming accounts and no permission had been given for expert evidence to be adduced. Mr Phillips had no first-hand knowledge of the matters in dispute. Mr Radley’s evidence, in summary, was that the field was cultivated when he bought Mill Green Farm, that it stopped being cultivated in 2015 or 2016 and that he had not seen it being used or occupied since then. So, “a while ago” he obtained permission to mow the strip nearest Mill Green Farm to protect his garden from damage. I accept that evidence albeit he may be mistaken as to the year when the Field stopped being cultivated – it may have been in 2017.

42. The main issues on which the Applicant and Sally, on the one hand, and the Respondent and Tom, on the other hand, differed related to discussions with Bob that the Applicant says took place in 1999 and whether the Applicant’s use of the Field was with the Respondent’s permission given in the aftermath of his death. In the nature of things, recollections of events that mostly took place a quarter of a century ago are unlikely to be very reliable. They will also be prone to distortion arising from the process of litigation itself. Without any conscious intention to deceive, a party’s recollection can sometimes bend towards the version of events that suits their case over the course of a dispute. For that reason, contemporaneous documents are often a better guide to what happened than the parties’ conflicting recollections.

43. A crucial piece of evidence, in my judgment, was an exchange of text messages that took place between the Respondent and Sally in April 2017. The exchange went as follows: Respondent: Also can you send me the documents I need for Millgreen Farm land. l know there is a subsidy thing I have to keep on top of. I also need to get somebody to rent it. Not sure who to go to yet but will sort it somehow. You do know that Paul told me he has given it up a while ago . I just haven't got round to sorting it yet. Sally: Paul said he has it in hand with the land and is still looking after it. Paul says you have to be taxed and registered as a farmer which Paul is happy to do, it makes no odds either way. Respondent: Am confused. Paul told me he was giving it up. Sally: I don't know, that's what he said x he is still looking after it It's a shame this can never be resolved. June Paul just said to tell you to look into land bids in Stowupland they are looking for land again around here for building, he said he will keep maintaining while that happening. He think it would be worth looking into x

44. It was the Applicant’s and Sally’s evidence that they believed that the Applicant had been left the Field in Bob’s will and that Bob had indicated in the disputed meeting mentioned above, which both the Applicant and Sally attended on the Applicant’s case, that he intended to leave it to the Applicant. The text exchange quoted in the previous paragraph is completely inconsistent with that. The exchange is only consistent with Sally, and the Applicant, whom the exchange shows was aware of the text conversation being conducted by Sally, believing that the Field belonged to the Respondent and that Paul was looking after it for her. The reference to looking into land bids shows an understanding that the Field was the Respondent’s to sell, not the Applicant’s.

45. The Applicant and Sally were both cross-examined about those text messages and sought to explain away their apparent meaning in an entirely unpersuasive, and somewhat evasive, fashion. I regard those texts as providing strong support for the Respondent’s evidence which was that there was no intention to leave the Field to the Applicant, no meeting at which Bob told the Applicant in the Respondent’s presence that he would leave the Field to the Applicant and that she agreed with the Applicant in the aftermath of Bob’s death that the Applicant would look after the Field for the time being.

46. It is also material to this aspect of the dispute that Bob could not have left the Field to the Applicant in his will unless first of all Bob and the Respondent had split the title of Mill Green Farm into separate titles and transferred the Field into Bob’s sole name. That did not happen. The solicitors who drafted Bob’s and the Respondent’s wills in 1999, Gudgeons, had acted on the purchase of Mill Green Farm and so can be taken to have been aware that Mill Green Farm and the Field were part of the same title and were jointly owned by Bob and the Respondent. There is no hint in Bob’s will or in the letter of 5 October 1999 from Gudgeons to Bob and the Respondent enclosing draft wills that those solicitors had been instructed that the Field was to be separated from the rest of Mill Green Farm and dealt with separately under Bob’s will. I consider that to support the Respondent’s evidence that there were no discussions before Bob’s death about leaving the Field to the Applicant.

47. I therefore reject the Applicant’s and Sally’s evidence that they were told by Bob that he would be leaving them the Field and believed that he had done so. I prefer the Respondent’s evidence that there was no such discussion and that after Bob’s death she agreed with the Applicant that he would look after the Field for her for as long as needed. There is nothing inherently unlikely about that since the Respondent was the Applicant’s newly bereaved mother.

48. In reaching that conclusion, I have not overlooked the fact that in Bob’s accounts for his farming business he included as an asset freehold property with a value of £137,853. That can only be a reference to Mill Green Farm (the whole of it, not just the Field) as it was common ground that Bob did not own any other freehold property. I do not consider that any great weight can be placed on that. As a matter of fact, Bob was not the sole owner of Mill Green Farm but inclusion of it in the accounts as an asset of his business would probably have allowed him to treat mortgage payments as an expense of the farming business for tax purposes. So, I do not regard the accounts as shedding any light on whether the Field was to be left to the Applicant.

49. I therefore answer the first two questions posed in paragraph 37 above as follows: (1) the Applicant never went into adverse possession of the Field but rather had use of it with the permission of the Respondent; (2) the Applicant did not have the necessary intention to possess the Field while he had use of it as he was aware that he was looking after it for the Respondent while taking any income from it with the Respondent’s consent.

50. Either of those two conclusions are sufficient to dispose of this application. Their consequences are that the Applicant was not in adverse possession of the Field for a period of at least 10 years ending with the making of his application and so I must direct the Chief Land Registrar to cancel his application to be registered as proprietor of the Field. Nevertheless, I shall discuss the other issues that arise if I am wrong in reaching that conclusion.

51. If, contrary to my above conclusion, the Applicant did go into adverse possession of the Field following Bob’s death, I consider that he was still in possession in November 2021 when he made his application to the Land Registry. As discussed above, the Respondent emailed the Applicant in September 2019 telling him to, in effect, get off her land. However, she did not take any action to take possession of the Field if, contrary to my findings, she had lost it. She did give Mr Radley permission to mow the strip discussed above which might be said to constitute the retaking of possession but there was no evidence before me to show that this took place before November 2021 when the application to the Land Registry was made. While the Applicant appears to have done every little with the Field after 2019 he did have some drains repaired in it and I am not satisfied that he went out of possession if he was ever in possession. Some other reason – Bob’s will

52. In any event, this application cannot succeed unless I am satisfied that, for the purposes of Schedule 6, paragraph 5, the Applicant is entitled to be registered as proprietor of the Field because it was left to him under Bob’s will. I am not satisfied of that.

53. Whether or not Bob’s will purported to leave the Field to the Applicant, it could not do so because Bob was not sole owner of the Field. At most Bob’s will could have left the Applicant a 50% beneficial interest in the Field. In my judgment that would not be sufficient for the purposes of Schedule 6, paragraph 5(3). Under that paragraph, the applicant must be entitled to be registered as the proprietor of the estate for some other reason. Someone who is bequeathed a 50% beneficial interest in land is not entitled to be registered as its proprietor as a result of the bequest. In my view, a gift under a will can only entitle someone to rely on Schedule 6, paragraph 5(3) if that gift is of the entire legal interest in the land in question.

54. Furthermore, I am not satisfied that Bob’s will left the Applicant even a beneficial 50% interest in the Field. The Field and the Mill Green Farm house and gardens were all contained in one legal title when Bob died. There is no dispute that the whole of Mill Green Farm passed to the Respondent – that Bob’s residuary estate included his interest in the house and Gardens of Mill Green Farm. In those circumstances there would have had to have been very clear words in the will providing for the Field to be separated from the rest of Mill Green Farm and to pass separately for the Field (or rather Bob’s interest in the Field) not be included in Bob’s residuary estate.

55. The Applicant’s case in that regard is that the words “my tenancy of Ashes Farm Newton Road Stowmarket and the assets of the farming business carried on by me thereat including agricultural equipment book debts growing crops milk quota and the money (if any) standing to the credit of my farm current account” included the Field because the Field was one of the parcels of land that Bob farmed. In other words, the Applicant contends that the Field was an asset of the farming business that Bob carried on at Ashes Farm. The Applicant relies on the inclusion of Mill Green Farm in Bob’s accounts in support of that contention.

56. The Respondent disputes that proposition because, amongst other reasons, the gift refers to the farming business carried on at Ashes Farm. The Applicant points out that the farming business based at Ashes Farm was also carried on elsewhere including the Haughley Smallholding. I agree that the phrase “the assets of the farming business carried on by me thereat” is capable of encompassing assets used in Bob’s farming business even though not used on the land at Ashes Farm.

57. I do not agree, however, that the gift was intended to include freehold land, let alone freehold land which was not contained in a separate title and of which Bob was only part owner. As a matter of interpretation of the words used, I consider that the phrase “agricultural equipment book debts growing crops milk quota and the money (if any) standing to the credit of my farm current account” indicates the sort of assets intended to be included in the phrase, “the assets of the farming business”. Although expressed non- exclusively, the items listed throw light on the sort of thing the testator intended to be encompassed in “the assets of the farming business” and suggests that land was not amongst them. The tenancy of Ashes Farm was specifically mentioned in the bequest and if it had been intended to leave the Field one would expect that to have been specifically mentioned too.

58. The 5 October 1999 letter from Gudgeons is admissible evidence that I can take account on the construction of Bob’s will pursuant to s. 81 of the Administration of Justice Act 1982 to resolve any ambiguity about the testator’s intentions. There is nothing in that letter to suggest that the Field was intended to be separated from the rest of Mill Green Farm and left to the Applicant as an asset of Bob’s farming business carried on at Ashes Farm. As mentioned above, Gudgeons acted in the purchase of Mill Green Farm and so could have been expected to mention the Field if it was intended to be gifted separately from the rest of the property. They do not mention it in that letter.

59. I therefore conclude that Bob’s will did not leave the Applicant Bob’s interest in the Field. That passed with Bob’s interest in the rest of Mill Green Farm as part of Bob’s residuary estate which was left to the Respondent. Conclusion

60. I will therefore direct the Chief Land Registrar to cancel the Applicant’s application to be registered as proprietor of the Field.

61. I have not yet heard any submissions on costs, which I propose to decide with reference to written submissions. So, if any party wishes to apply for costs they should make a reasoned application in writing, accompanied by a schedule of costs within 35 days. The schedule should be limited to costs incurred after the matter was referred to the Tribunal by the Land Registry. Such an application should be served on the other party who will then have 28 days to respond to the application by way of written submissions sent to the Tribunal, copying any submissions to the applying party. Any response to such submissions should be provided to the Tribunal and the other party within 21 days of receipt of the submissions. BY ORDER OF THE TRIBUNAL Daniel Gatty Judge Daniel Gatty Dated this 4 th day of August 2025