Jujhar Singh Sahota & Anor v Dorota Newman

MR JUSTICE ADAM JOHNSON:

1. I am faced with an application for committal brought by the Claimants in these proceedings. They have now obtained judgment for a liquidated sum against the Defendant, Ms Newman. As explained in the skeleton argument of Mr Aslett, counsel for the Claimants, the Defendant has played no part at all in the proceedings to date, and she has not attended before the Court today.

2. The Claimants seek an order for committal of the Defendant for contempt. That application arises from the terms of a freezing order made on 21 March 2025 by Miles J and continued by order of Marcus Smith J made on 3 April 2025. The freezing order contained provisions requiring the production of information as to the Defendant’s assets: see at paragraphs 8 and 9. The Claimants’ case is that those provisions have not been complied with, with the consequence that the Defendant, having been duly notified of the order, is in contempt.

3. The Defendant not appearing before the Court this morning, the first question to address is whether to proceed with the application for committal in her absence. In that regard, Mr Aslett has drawn attention to the comments made by Warren J in Taylor v Van Dutch Marine Holding Limited & Ors [2016] EWHC 2201 Ch 51. Warren J set out a number of factors to be taken into account in determining whether to proceed with an application in the absence of the Defendant, which include whether an adjournment would be likely to secure the attendance of the Defendant or at least facilitate their representation.

4. Mr Aslett has made the argument that here there is little point in an adjournment, given the Defendant’s historic lack of engagement with the proceedings. He has relied on the fact that communications with the Defendant in relation to the present application have failed to elicit any response. That includes evidence showing service of the committal application and supporting evidence by permitted alternative means on 15 July 2025; service of a copy of the hearing notice on 18 August 2025; and service of a copy of the hearing bundle and associated documents, including skeleton argument, on 20 November 2025. That was followed by a further communication sent by WhatsApp yesterday, 25 November 2025. The WhatsApp messages I have been shown indicate that they were read by the Defendant, although the telephone number used to transmit them appears now to have been blocked by the Defendant.

5. All that is noted. However, I also drew attention during the hearing to the provision in CPR rule 81.7(2) which memorialises the Court’s power to issue a bench warrant to secure the attendance of the defendant at a directions hearing, or at the substantive hearing of a contempt application. I have also referenced two authorities dealing with that practice, namely Edward Hanson & Ors v Nicholas Carlino & Anor [2019] EWHC 1366 (Ch) , and Attorney General v Branch [2021] EWHC 1735 (Admin) . In the latter decision Dingemans LJ set out, at paragraphs [13] to [18], a summary of the jurisdiction to issue a bench warrant. A warrant was issued in that case when the defendant, Mr Branch, failed to attend the hearing of a contempt application on 19 May 2021. The issue of the warrant was thought to hold a fair balance between, on the one hand, the importance of the Court process being managed efficiently versus, on the other, the important principle that the defendant to a committal application should be before the Court wherever possible and with the benefit of legal representation if they choose to have it.

6. It seems to me that those principles are in play in this case. The Court is keen to ensure that justice is administered efficiently and that includes taking appropriate steps to ensure that orders it has made are duly complied with. That is a powerful reason for continuing with the application immediately, given the Defendant’s historical lack of engagement. On the other hand, there is an important interest in ensuring that the Defendant is given every opportunity to engage with the Court process and to avail herself of legal advice and representation in connection with such an important matter as an application for committal to prison.

7. It has been said, both in the Hanson case and the Branch case, that the issue of a bench warrant is an extreme remedy. I accept that is so, and that the jurisdiction should be exercised cautiously and only in appropriate cases. However, the evidence before me suggests this is an appropriate case. The Claimants, having obtained judgment, are plainly being frustrated in their enforcement efforts by the Defendant’s failure to provide the required information as to her assets. Their interests need to be protected. At the same time, that has to be balanced against the undesirability of proceeding in the Defendant’s absence, if there is still a chance that she may appear.

8. Balancing these factors together, what I propose to do is to adjourn the proceedings overnight. I will direct that the application comes back before the court at 12 noon tomorrow, 27 November 2025. In the meantime I will issue a bench warrant today to be executed immediately, requiring the Defendant’s attendance at the hearing tomorrow. At that point, if the Defendant appears, the Court will hear further submissions from the parties as to how the matter should be progressed and resolved. LATER

9. I have called the matter back before the Court for further argument since an examination of the standard form of bench warrant gives rise to a question. The question is whether there is jurisdiction to issue a bench warrant on a stand-alone basis, in circumstances where there has been no prior order addressed to a defendant requiring their attendance at a hearing. The point comes about because the standard form seems to assume that a prior order has been made, which the defendant has ignored, and the bench warrant is then issued as an aid to enforcement of that prior order.

10. First of all, there is an issue of principle. Secondly, there is a question of mechanics. I will take these in turn.

11. On the issue of principle, I am persuaded by Mr Aslett’s submissions that there is jurisdiction to issue a bench warrant to compel attendance by a party at a hearing, even in the absence of any prior order requiring it. The nature of the jurisdiction is a wide one. It has been expressed in a number of ways, including by HHJ Birss QC (as he then was) in Westwood v Knight [2012] EWPCC 14 as part of the inherent jurisdiction of the Court, particularly to ensure that other orders it makes are complied with (see at [140]). Other cases -- Law Society v McPhail (a decision of Norris J dated 11 February 2011) is a good example -- seem to indicate that practice in contempt hearings has indeed gone as far as the Court issuing a bench warrant in cases where the defendant has failed to appear at the hearing of a contempt application, even without any prior order compelling attendance.

12. I am persuaded that the jurisdiction is sufficiently wide for me at least to do the following. I will adjourn the contempt application as already indicated earlier today to a further hearing, and will make an order now compelling the Defendant to attend that hearing. That seems to me entirely justified, given the history of the matter and the Defendant’s long track record of non-engagement. I will also issue a bench warrant immediately today in support of the order requiring attendance. My logic is that even if the function of a bench warrant is to facilitate compliance with other orders of the Court, there is no good reason why the relevant order cannot be one I make now, requiring attendance at a future hearing. There is every reason to think that such an order, even if made, is likely to be ignored without some more direct form of compulsion backing it up.

13. It seems to me that is an appropriate course in the circumstances. I cannot see the justification for proceeding sequentially – i.e., making an order requiring attendance only in the expectation of it being ignored, in order to provide a basis for then issuing a bench warrant at a future hearing. That would seem entirely wasteful of Court time and resources. So on the point of principle, I am very grateful indeed to Mr Aslett for his research and he has persuaded me that I have jurisdiction to proceed.

14. On the question of practicalities, given where we are now in the day and the need to be fair to the Defendant, what I propose to do is to vary the directions given this morning as follows. I will adjourn the matter until 10.30 a.m. on Tuesday next week, 2 December 2025. I will make the order I have referred to requiring attendance at that time and will issue a bench warrant in support of it.

15. I will need to liaise with the Tipstaff to ensure that the warrant is executed in an orderly way. What I would not want, for example, is to have Ms Newman detained today or tomorrow and then held in custody over the weekend until next Tuesday. It may be that the appropriate thing, therefore, is to suspend execution of the warrant until Monday 1 December. That is a matter of logistics for the Tipstaff to advise on. The Defendant should in any event be notified of the outcome of this hearing, so she can have a further and final chance to reconsider her position. - - - - - - - - - - - (This Judgment has been approved by Mr Justice Adam Johnson.) Digital Transcription by Marten Walsh Cherer Ltd 2 nd Floor, Quality House, 6-9 Quality Court, Chancery Lane, London WC2A 1HP Tel No: 020 7067 2900. DX: 410 LDE Email: [email protected] Web: www.martenwalshcherer.com