David William Chester v CK and D Muir Ltd

1. The matter that has been referred to the Tribunal is the Applicant’s application dated 26 th September 2022 for first registration of land on the North Side of the Old Saw Mill, Easington, Saltburn-by-the-Sea TS13 4UB (“the Paddock”) based on adverse possession.

2. The Applicant is the registered proprietor of land and buildings to the North of Snipe Lane, Easington, registered under title number CE105695, excerpt from the title plan below (“the Registered Land”). The buildings were previously an old sawmill, but the Applicant has converted them into a dwelling. He purchased the Registered Land in 1989, and spent several years renovating it before moving in. Registered Land (left) The Paddock (right)

3. The Paddock is the land to the north of the Registered Land. It is a grassed area enclosed by a wall and gates. The Applicant has marked it green as shown above.

4. The Applicant’s claim in very general terms is that the Paddock is and always has been part of the old sawmill and that he has used it as such. Although he made his application for first registration expressly referring to adverse possession, it was clear that he also wanted to argue that he had paper title.

5. The Respondent is the owner of neighbouring, unregistered, land. The Respondent purchased a large tranche of land by conveyance dated 25 th August 1964 (“the Conveyance”), albeit some of it has since been sold off. I will refer to the Respondent’s land as “the Farm”.

6. The Respondent avers that it has paper title to the Paddock pursuant to the Conveyance, that it has used the Paddock since 1964, and that in any event the Applicant has not at any stage been in adverse possession.

7. The Respondent is a family company, with the key people for the purposes of these proceedings being Keith Muir (deceased), his son Richard, and his daughters Sarah and Paddy. Richard, Sarah & Paddy Muir gave evidence, as did Kevin Collinson, son of the Applicant’s predecessor Edwin Collinson, and Rob Walker, a former gamekeeper. Darren Lindsey, a former employee, provided a statement but did not attend to give oral evidence. Paper title

8. Notwithstanding that (a) the Applicant’s application was expressly for adverse possession rather than paper title, and (b) the Respondent has not made its own application for first registration of the Paddock based on paper title, both parties urged me to make findings in respect of paper title ownership (subject to whether that title has been extinguished by adverse possession). To this end, the Applicant brought with him to the hearing various documents, including an abstract of title (“the Applicant’s Abstract”). Counsel for the Respondent was able to consider these documents; and the parties co-operated in agreeing which were relevant (no issue was taken that they were provided late).

9. I agree that it is sensible for the Tribunal to resolve as many disputes between the parties as can conveniently and fairly be achieved. Counsel for the Respondent argued that paper title ownership might be relevant to the intention to possess. It is also, in my judgment, within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction to consider the Applicant’s case that he is entitled to first registration based on paper title: the application that has been referred is an application for first registration, which might be made out based on either adverse possession or paper title. Evidence

10. It is helpful to begin by setting out the relevant documents, before considering each party’s case as to paper title ownership.

11. The matter relates to land that was formerly part of the Grinkle Park Estate (“the Estate”). The Estate was put up for sale by auction on 26 th September 1946: the Respondent had disclosed a copy of the auction sales particulars, and the original was available at the hearing. An excerpt from the plan to the sales particulars (“the Sales Particulars Plan”) is reproduced below. Sales Particulars Plan

12. The descriptions of Lots 6 & 7 are reproduced below. Lots 6 & 7

13. Also relevant is Lot 11. This is land coloured yellow on the Sales Particulars Plan, that is, land to the north, east and west of Lots 6 & 7, and is described as Grinkle Park Farm. The main part of the description, together with the schedule, are reproduced below. Lot 11 & Schedule

14. Finally, I note Lots 12 & 13, which are described as being cottages with detached gardens, of 25 and 29 poles respectively.

15. In terms of land owned by the Respondent, the only conveyancing document available is the Conveyance. This describes the land conveyed as “ ALL THOSE pieces of freehold land adjoining Grinkle Lane in the Parish of Easington near Loftus in the North Riding of the County of York containing Two Hundred and Four point Seven Hundred and Twenty Four acres of thereabouts being for the purposes of identification only delineated and coloured red on the plan annexed hereto and being also more particularly described in the Schedule hereunder written TOGETHER WITH the farmhouse farm buildings and three cottages comprising and being known as Grinkle Park Farm and the dwellinghouse known as Grinkle Lodge erected on the said pieces of land or on some part thereof ”.

16. An extract from the schedule is below. A copy of the relevant part of the plan was provided part way through the hearing. Conveyance Schedule

17. Comparing the schedule and the acreage with the sales particulars, the Conveyance appears to convey what was Lot 6 (Grinkle Lodge, 0.419 acres), Lot 12 (one of the cottages, 0.156 acres), and Lot 11 (Grinkle Park Farm, 205.245 acres) excluding a woodland strip (1.096 acres). This equals the 204.724 acres referenced in the description. The Respondent has since sold off some of this land (including the Lodge), but nothing that is relevant for these purposes.

18. In terms of the land owned by the Applicant, there is an entry in the Applicant’s Abstract recording a conveyance of 21 st April 1947 between Mark Palmer and Eva Gertrude Jepson as transferring “ ALL THT pce or pcl of land site at Grinkle afrsd contnd in the whole 2 roods 14 poles or thbts being pt of No 179 on the Ordnance Survey Plan WH sd pce or pcl of land is more prly deltd and descbd on the plan attached thrto and thron cold blue TOG with the bldgs erected thron or on some pt throf and known as “The Estate Yard ”. The conveyance itself was not available, but the parties agreed the plan referred to is the Sales Particulars Plan. This would certainly be logical, given the similarities with the Sales Particulars Plan and the description of Lot 7. On its face, this is a conveyance of the Registered Land.

19. This is followed by a conveyance dated 1 st July 1959 between Eva Gertrude Jepson and John Richardson of “ ALL THAT piece or parcel of land situate at Grinkle near Loftus in the Parish of Easington in the County of York containing the whole Two roods Fourteen poles or thereabouts being part of Field No. 179 on the Ordnance Survey Plan Which said piece or parcel of land is more particularly delineated and described on the plan attached on a Conveyance dated the Twenty first day of April One thousand nine hundred and Forty seven and made between Mark Palmer of the one part and the Vendor if the other part and thereon coloured blue TOGETHER with the buildings erected thereon or on some part thereof and known as “The Estate Yard ”. Again, on its face, this is a conveyance of the Registered Land.

20. There are then later transfers – a 1976 conveyance, a 1987 assent, and finally the 1989 conveyance to the Applicant – all of which define the property being transferred by reference to the 1959 conveyance. Arguments

21. The Applicant argues that the Paddock is within his paper title – he says it forms part of the Estate Yard/Lot 7, was part of the land conveyed in 1947, and has continued “ all the way down ” the later transfers. The immediate issue with this is that Lot 7 is described as the land coloured blue, and the land coloured blue corresponds with the Registered Land and does not include the Paddock. Nonetheless, the Applicant has various reasons why the Paddock is included.

22. Firstly, he argues that the Sales Particulars Plan shows the Paddock as “ togged ” to the land coloured blue – a reference to the elongated s shape just below the number 179 – which, he says, signifies the Paddock as “ belonging to ” the Registered Land. The elongated s is an area brace symbol, formerly known as a field tie, used by Ordnance Survey to show that the areas of land either side of the solid line it crosses are part of the same field number. Contrary to the Applicant’s submission, that does not mean the two areas of land are necessarily in the same ownership.

23. Secondly, he relies on the description of Lot 7 as including the words “ together with a walled grass yard ”, which he says is a reference to the Paddock. I do not accept this submission. Although there is a reference to a walled grass yard, it appears from the Sales Particulars Plan that this is the enclosed area of the land to the south of the building. Moreover, the description states, “ Included, is a good Range of stone and brick Buildings…. Together with…. ”, the inference being that it is the buildings together with one walled grass yard, not two.

24. Thirdly, he argues it is significant that Lot 7 uses the words “ extends to about ”, whereas Lot 11 says “ extending altogether to about” . The Applicant submits that the acreage in the description of Lot 7 refers only to the land coloured blue, such that the failure to use the word “ altogether ” suggests that it includes land other than the land coloured blue. I do not accept that there is any significance in whether the words “ extends to about ” or “ extending altogether to about” are used: looking throughout the sales particulars, they appear to be used interchangeably (for example, lots 12 & 13 are very much comparable lots, but they use the two different forms of words). I note for completeness there is no evidence of the acreage of the Paddock, the Registered Land, or indeed any other parcel of land, to be able to support or contradict the Applicant’s assertion.

25. Fourthly, he avers that the references in the schedule to lot 11 to the “ Stackyard ”, with 0.767 acreage, and the “ Buildings ”, with 0.593 acreage, are the Paddock and the Registered Land respectively, and that they have both been included by mistake. Taking these in turn: (a) I agree that the “ Stackyard ” is the Paddock, but I cannot see there is any basis for saying this has been included in the schedule to Lot 11 by mistake. Insofar as the Applicant believes that “ Stackyard ” is a reference to stacks of timber, I accept Counsel for the Respondent’s submission that the more usual usage of this word is with reference to stacks of hay, and thus more likely to be associated with a farm than a sawmill; (b) I do not agree that “ Buildings ” are the Registered Land. They are described as “ Part of 179b ”, whereas the Registered Land is part of 179, as per the area brace symbol. Moreover, the acreage is 0.593 acres, which is 2 roods 15 poles, not the 2 roods 14 poles (0.5875 acres) mentioned in Lot 7. Finally, I note that the description of Lot 6 includes “ Garage in the Home Farm Buildings, part of Lot 11 ”, and that one of arrows indicating Lot 6 points to the buildings to the north of Grinkle Lodge and east of the Paddock: the “ Buildings ” in the schedule to lot 11 refer to those buildings and not the sawmill/buildings on the Registered Land; (c) I note for completeness that these areas are contained in the schedule to the Conveyance as the “ Bull Park ” and “ Buildings ”.

26. Finally, the Applicant made reference to his purchase in 1989 being based on an “ old style plan ” that was rejected by HM Land Registry, meaning that only half of the land he bought was registered. The “ old style plan ” was not in evidence. In any event, the seller could only have sold to him land which the seller himself owned, irrespective of what was shown on the plan. The Applicant makes reference in his FR1 to being “ duped ”, but that is a matter between him and the seller, and is not for this Tribunal.

27. A similar point could be made against the Respondent, in the sense that the Conveyance could not convey land that their predecessor did not own. However, I am quite satisfied that, when the Estate was divided up in around 1946, the Paddock was sold as part of Grinkle Park Farm (Lot 11) and not as part of the Estate Yard (Lot 7/the Registered Land). It seems to me that this is obvious from the colouring on the Sales Particulars Plan, and I do not accept any of the Applicant’s arguments to the contrary. I note for completeness that all of the conveyancing evidence since is entirely consistent with this, and there is no evidence to suggest that the Paddock has ever been sold off and ended up as part of the Estate Yard/the Registered Land.

28. For these reasons, I am not satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the Applicant is the paper title owner of the Paddock. Rather, I am satisfied that the Respondent is the paper title owner, subject to the Applicant’s claim for adverse possession. Adverse possession

29. I turn now to consider whether the Respondent’s paper title has been extinguished by adverse possession.

30. To succeed, the Applicant must demonstrate, on the balance of probabilities, both factual possession of, and an intention to possess, the Paddock, for a continuous period of 12 years.

31. Factual possession “ signifies an appropriate degree of physical control… The question what acts constitute a sufficient degree of exclusive physical control must depend on the circumstances, in particular the nature of the land and the manner in which land of that nature is commonly used or enjoyed. In the case of open land, absolute physical control is normally impracticable, if only because it is generally impossible to secure every part of a boundary to prevent intrusion… Everything must depend on the particular circumstance, but broadly, I think what must be shown as constituting factual possession is that the alleged possessor has been dealing with the land in question as an occupying owner might have been expected to deal with it and that no-one else has done so" [Slade J in Powell v McFarlane (1977) 38 P & CR 452 at 470-1, cited with approval in J A Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] UKHL 30 ].

32. An intention to possess is the intention “ to exclude the world at large, including the owner with the paper title… so far as is reasonably practicable and so far as the processes of the law will allow” [Slade J in Powell at 471-2, cited with approval in Pye ].

33. The evidence of factual possession will often be sufficient to demonstrate the intention to possess, but this will not always be so: “ It is in cases where the acts in relation to the land of a person claiming title by adverse possession are equivocal and are open to more than one interpretation that those acts will be insufficient to establish the intention to possess ” [Lord Hutton in Pye at paragraph 76].

34. In those cases, an applicant must make it “ perfectly plain to the world at large by his actions or words that he has intended to exclude the owner as best he can ” [Slade J in Powell at 472]; he “ should be required to adduce compelling evidence that he has the requisite [intention to possess] ” [at 476].

35. In relation to the 12 year period, Counsel for the Respondent submitted that the Applicant’s case was premised on adverse possession from 1989 to 2001, and that this is the period the Respondent has focused on and is the case the Respondent has tried to meet: he argues that the Tribunal should restrict itself, or at least focus on, this period rather than any time later. It is correct that an ST1 completed by the Applicant gives the period of adverse possession as 1 st July 1989 to 1 st July 2001, but this follows an FR1 in which he avers that he has been in continuous possession of the Paddock since the completion of his purchase on 17 th July 1989. It seems to me that the Applicant has made it clear throughout these proceedings that he alleges he has been in adverse possession since 1989, and he should be able to pursue his case in relation to that entire period accordingly. The Applicant’s case

36. There is a particular angle to the Applicant’s case that it is convenient to address at the outset. This is the part of his case that runs as follows: his purchase included the Paddock; there was no evidence of use of the Paddock, on any of the three occasions when he viewed the property or when he bought it; the Respondent did not use it until much later (save Paddy Muir using it for horses, which he avers was with his permission).

37. The Respondent insists that it has always used the Paddock, for example, for horses (without permission) and hens and sheep. This led to a considerable amount of hotly disputed evidence about what the Respondent has or has not done on the Paddock, to the extent that at times it felt as though it was the Respondent’s application for adverse possession that was being contested by the Applicant.

38. That, of course, is not the case. I have already found that the Applicant’s purchase did not include the Paddock. I am concerned with whether he can demonstrate adverse possession of the Paddock, that is, factual possession and an intention to possess. It is right that use of the Paddock by the Respondent (without permission) would run counter to adverse possession, as the Applicant would struggle to demonstrate a sufficient degree of exclusive physical control and/or an intention to exclude the world at large so far as is reasonably practicable. But a lack of use by the Respondent is not of itself sufficient to amount to adverse possession – the Applicant must demonstrate what he himself has done.

39. I begin then by considering the Applicant’s acts of possession. The Applicant had not produced a stand-alone statement of case but had referred to the forms he had sent to HM Land Registry, meaning there was no one document clearly setting out his case in its entirety. At the start of the hearing, some time was taken in establishing what acts he was relying on, and he confirmed his case was as follows: he used the Paddock to carry out repairs to his roof and rear wall; he had dug soakaways; he accessed it when he wanted to; and he had given permission to Paddy Muir to use it for horses, which she moved any time he was working. Insofar as there are references in the documents to other works being carried out, it became clear that these were works on or to the Registered Land. For example, there was reference to maintaining the wall of the Paddock, but it transpired the Applicant was taking about the wall separating the Registered Land from the Paddock, rather than the wall separating the Paddock from the remainder of the Farm.

40. Before turning to the particular acts relied upon, it is helpful to provide some further background. The following is not controversial: (a) the Muir family used the Paddock for horses throughout the 1960s, 70s & 80s. I say this is uncontroversial as it is evidenced by photographs and the Applicant cannot offer any evidence to the contrary; (b) the Registered Land was previously a foundry/light fabrication business, but was largely abandoned by the time of the sale in 1989 (the previous owner Edwin Collinson died in 1986); (c) at around the time of the purchase, Paddy Muir used the walled grassed area that forms part of the Registered Land (that is, to the south of the building) for grazing horses. She continued this with the Applicant’s permission; (d) the Applicant carried out renovations before he moved in. To begin with, he was working full time, so the time he spent at the Registered Land was limited to evenings and weekends. He completely moved in in around 2005; (e) the works included works to the roof and the rear wall of his building that were carried out from the Paddock using scaffolding; (f) Keith Muir died in 2009; (g) Paddy Muir used the Paddock for horses until she left the Farm in around 2012; (h) issues between the parties did not arise until at least 2010 (2010, 2012, and 2014 are variously mentioned), including a discontinued county court claim for harassment by the Applicant in around 2016. Use of the Paddock

41. It is not in dispute that the Applicant erected scaffolding on the Paddock so as to carry out repairs to the roof and the rear wall of his building. There is some dispute as to how regularly this occurred, but it is not the Applicant’s case that it was constant (the highest he put it was that it could be for “ months on end ”). There is also some dispute as to whether this was with permission or not, with the Applicant denying the Respondent’s case that Keith gave him permission.

42. I do not, however, need to make specific findings on these points because, even taking the Applicant’s case at its highest, I am not satisfied that this use amounts to adverse possession. Firstly, I do not accept that the use demonstrates a sufficient degree of exclusive control, not least because it is use from time to time of only a small part of the Paddock. Secondly, and in any event, I am not satisfied that this use shows an intention to possess. It is, in my judgment, equivocal – it could just as easily be interpreted as the Applicant accessing the rear of his building for maintenance (whether pursuant to a right, or express or implied permission) as him intending to possess the Paddock. It does not make it “ perfectly plain… that he has intended to exclude the owner as best he can ”. Soakaways

43. The Applicant avers that he installed two soakaways on the Paddock. However, his evidence in relation to this is not clear.

44. At the start of the hearing, he stated this was in 2014, maybe 2015-2020 when he continued digging out, and that it was definitely 2016 when the Respondent complained. In this regard, I note there is a letter in the bundle from Richard Muir to the Applicant dated 9 th November 2016, stating “ you have repeatedly stated that you are worried about the drainage aspect to your building footings and have spent numerous hours without permission in our paddock… digging the soil against your building wall ”.

45. However, at the start of his oral evidence, when he was asked to confirm his case in respect of the soakaways by way of evidence in chief, he said he installed the soakaways in 1999/2000. His evidence was that the soakaways were pits 90cm deep filled with rubble, at the end of sloping trenches 12 inches wide and 5 metres long which ran from the two rainwater drainpipes to the rear of his building.

46. Moreover, the Applicant’s case is that the soakaways are not there any more, but he did not provide any detail as to when or why they were removed.

47. Richard and Paddy Muir both gave evidence to the effect that they did not see soakaways being installed and that they would have noticed had it happened. Paddy particularly said, “ if something happened I would have wanted a say… the horses could step in it ”, although she did volunteer that she would not have noticed if the works happened whilst she was away (she said she was never away longer than two weeks).

48. Again, I do not need to make a finding on this point, because, even taking the Applicant’s case at its highest, I am not satisfied it amounts to adverse possession: I do not accept it demonstrates a sufficient degree of exclusive control, and it could just as easily be interpreted as the Applicant dealing with the drainage (whether pursuant to a right, or express or implied permission) as him intending to possess the Paddock. Access

49. The Applicant points to the fact that he could access the Paddock whenever he wanted to. There is some dispute as to whether Keith gave him permission, with Richard Muir recalling his father telling him that the Applicant had asked for permission (the inference being that it was given). However, again, I do not need to make a finding on this point: the Applicant having access to the Paddock is not the same as him exercising any sort of control or demonstrating an intention to exclude others. Granting permission

50. In his FR1, the Applicant states that, on completion of his purchase, he went to the Registered Land to find Paddy Muir on the land at the front (that is, the walled grass area to the south), using it to graze her horses. He says, “ I told her it was alright by me to use the land for her horses ”, she used the land at the front for approximately two years, and “ when I started doing roofing work at the front she moved them on to the land at the rear. Until this time I was the only one on the land at the rear ”.

51. In his skeleton argument, he puts this a little differently. Firstly, he states that, “ when I spoke to her I said I did not mind ”. Then he states that, when he began working on the south side, “ Miss Paddy Muir approached me as to her using the land north side of the building which I was agreeable ”. He also states that she moved the horses elsewhere whenever he was working.

52. In cross-examination, the Applicant said, “ she said – is it alright if I put my horses on the back? ”. He did not accept that she may have said what she was going to do out of courtesy.

53. Paddy Muir accepts that the Applicant allowed her to use the south side of the building. In relation to the north side, she avers that her father Keith gave the Applicant permission to use scaffolding. In cross-examination, she denied asking “ is it alright if I put my horse on the paddock ”, saying “ we had always been using the paddock ”.

54. I am not satisfied that Paddy Muir’s use of the Paddock was with the Applicant’s permission. The thrust of her evidence is that she did not ask for permission because she did not need to, which it seems to me is more than likely correct bearing in mind she had been using the Paddock for many years at this point. There may well have been a conversation about the horses moving from the front of the building to the rear, but, even if I accept that she said, “ is it alright if I put my horse on the paddock ”, I do not accept that this should be construed as seeking permission – it could just as easily be a courtesy and/or checking that the Applicant was not about to access the Paddock for works himself any time soon. Similarly, I do not accept there is anything in the fact that Paddy Muir moved the horses when the Applicant was carrying out works – this is just common sense. Other issues

55. Firstly, and for the avoidance of doubt, I note that, whilst I have considered the Applicant’s acts separately and found that individually they do not amount to adverse possession, I also find that taken together they fall well short.

56. I turn to the Respondent’s assertion that it has always used the Paddock. As I have explained, my focus is on the Applicant’s use rather than the Respondent’s use, but the two are to an extent interlinked.

57. The Respondent’s case is that it has always used the Paddock, for example for showjumping (which the Applicant did not accept), hens and sheep, and leisure activities. As well as the Muirs themselves, Mr Walker gave oral evidence about the period from 1995-2002, and recalled collecting eggs from the hen house.

58. Their case is supported by a variety of photographs, showing for example showjumps, Richard shooting, the local hunt on the land, nieces collecting eggs, and also aerial photographs showing the hen house in various positions. Given their age, they are not digitally dated, but Paddy explained that they had been dated by reference to the horses and also the clothing and appearance of the people in them. Moreover, the Applicant accepted that some of them could be dated by the condition of the building on the Registered Land, e.g. the photograph of the hunt must be after the late-90s due to the condition of the roof. Whilst the Applicant sought to suggest that some of the dates were inaccurate, including challenging the alleged age of Richard & Paddy in certain photographs, there is really nothing to gainsay the dates put forward.

59. The Applicant maintains that the Respondent did not use the Paddock as alleged. He points to aerial photographs that do not show any livestock. However, there are only a handful of these available. Moreover, Richard explained that the hens would not necessarily stay on the Paddock, but were able to roam the Farm – it is just that the Paddock is where the hen house was more often than not situated.

60. The Applicant faces a further difficulty, and that is the limited knowledge he has of the Paddock, particularly before the issues between the parties arose. On his own account, he was not at the Registered Land very often. Save for velux windows that he installed, there were no windows overlooking the Paddock. He did not have to pass the Paddock to access the Registered Land.

61. Moreover, he accepted the Respondent replaced a gate, but he did not know what type (material) of gate was replaced or when this took place because he had “ no interest ” in it. He was not aware of the collapse of part of the wall, only that he saw rebuilding works going on. He only recently discovered that the Respondent had dug a trench in the Paddock (which he then blamed, without any basis, for the collapse of the wall, even though the two happened at different times). This is not the evidence of someone who is paying attention to the Paddock.

62. I am satisfied that the Respondent did continue to use the Paddock after the Applicant purchased the Registered Land. This is further support for my finding that the Applicant has neither exercised a sufficient degree of control nor demonstrated an intention to exclude others.

63. I have mentioned already the Applicant’s difficulties in demonstrating an intention to possess when the acts he relies on are equivocal. In this regard, I also refer to the following: (a) on 22 nd April 2015, the Applicant wrote to Sarah Muir to inform her that he would be carrying out further pointing and remedial works to the rear of his building. He refers to a nuisance caused by planting against his property wall, and states “ I have full legal access, right of way, drainage etc to enable me to maintain the rear of my property from the paddock ”; (b) in September 2016, he wrote, “ now that everything has become clear, I have no problem to the disclosure that they own the paddock adjoining my property. I need access of approx. 2m from my wall, so as to erect a platform scaffold if need be, without the obstacles of plants shrubs and trees ”; (c) in cross-examination, the Applicant said that he had had his doubts about whether he was right about ownership of the Paddock, that at this time he “ wasn’t sure ”, and that he had no “ hard evidence ”.

64. The Applicant’s explanation notwithstanding, it is difficult to find that he had an intention to possess the Paddock when he was asserting easements only. This is further support for my finding that the Applicant did not have an intention to possess the Paddock.

65. The Applicant had, in writing, made an allegation that Beverley Muir had doctored documents. This was never very well particularised, although, as I understand it, it was with reference to the Sales Particulars Plan. At the final hearing, the Applicant accepted this was accurate and did not pursue the point. There was instead a suggestion that aerial photographs had been doctored, but I struggle to understand the basis for this. For the avoidance of doubt, I find any allegation of doctoring evidence entirely groundless.

66. It is clear from the Applicant’s case that he has concerns about being able to access the rear of his building for maintenance, as well as concerns about drainage and root damage. These concerns are understandable. However, they are not a reason for allowing his application for adverse possession. I encourage the parties to try and resolve any outstanding issues without the need for further litigation. Conclusion

67. For the reasons given above, I am not satisfied that the Applicant is entitled to first registration of the Paddock on the basis of either paper title or adverse possession. I will direct the Chief Land Registrar to cancel his application.

68. I turn to consider costs. Ordinarily, the unsuccessful party will be ordered to pay the costs of the successful party: see rule 13(1)(c) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal)(Property Chamber) Rules 2013 and paragraph 9.1(b) of the Practice Direction. Here, that would mean an order that the Applicant pay the Respondent’s costs, unless there is some good reason to make a different order. I know of no reason why it would not be just to make the usual order in this case.

69. My preliminary view is therefore that the Applicant pay the Respondent’s costs of these proceedings (from the date the matter was referred, 12 th June 2024), to be summarily assessed if not agreed.

70. Any application for costs should be sent to the Tribunal and the other side by 5pm on 18 th December 2025, and should include an estimate of the amount of costs sought. Further directions will then be given as appropriate. Dated this Thursday 20 th November 2025 Laura D’Cruz By Order of The Tribunal