Crin Stefan v Urzicenci District Court, Romania

Mr Justice Sweeting: Introduction

1. The Applicant is sought by the Urziceni District Court, Romania (“the JA”), to serve a sentence of one year and four months’ imprisonment for driving without a licence. This sentence arose from the activation of a suspended sentence imposed on 13 June 2019, which became final on 10 July 2019 due to non-appeal. The decision to activate the suspended sentence was made by the Urziceni Trial Court on 14 April 2021, becoming final and binding on 5 January 2022. An Arrest Warrant (“AW”) was issued on 20 September 2024 and certified by the National Crime Agency (“NCA”) on 13 October 2024.

2. The Applicant was arrested on 13 October 2024 and appeared before Westminster Magistrates’ Court the following day, being released on conditional bail. District Judge Sarah Turnock ordered his extradition to Romania on 29 January 2025.

3. Initial grounds of appeal were filed on 4 February 2025. Perfected grounds of appeal, served out of time on 11 March 2025, raised grounds under Section 21 of the Extradition Act 2003 (“ the Act ”) (Article 8 European Convention on Human Rights, “ECHR”), and a new ground under Section 20 of the Act . The Respondent opposed the admission of the perfected grounds due to their late service.

4. On 20 May 2025, Mr Justice Bourne refused permission to appeal on paper, concluding that it was not reasonably arguable that the District Judge’s decision in relation to Article 8 ECHR or Section 20 of the Act was wrong. In relation to Section 20 , he observed that the Applicant attended his trial and appeal, and that Section 20 is not triggered by non-attendance at a hearing solely related to the execution of an original suspended sentence. The question of extending time for the perfected grounds and allowing the Section 20 point to be taken (it not having been raised at the extradition hearing) was left open for renewal. The point raised by reference to Section 20 was a matter of law which was argued fully before me at the renewal hearing. I gave permission for the perfected grounds to be relied on, so raising the Section 20 point.

5. The Applicant’s skeleton argument for the permission hearing listed on 21 August 2025 confirmed that the Section 21 Article 8 ECHR ground was no longer maintained. The remaining issue was the Section 20 ground and the admissibility of fresh evidence in relation to it. Application to Adduce Fresh Evidence

6. The Applicant seeks to adduce a report from Advocate Axinte Giliola, a Romanian lawyer. The Respondent opposes this application.

7. The well-established test for the admission of fresh evidence, set out in Szombathely City Court v Fenyvesi [2009] EWHC 231 (Admin) . To be admissible, the Court must be satisfied that: i) The evidence could not, with reasonable diligence, have been adduced earlier. ii) It would have had a decisive influence on the result of the case.

8. Having carefully considered the submissions, I do not consider that the evidence meets this test.

9. First, the evidence does not disclose any new facts or legal issues that were not already known or discoverable at the time of the extradition hearing. The legal framework regarding Romanian appellate procedure was available well before the appeal stage. No satisfactory explanation has been provided as to why this information was not adduced earlier, particularly given that the conviction and revocation decisions date from 2019 and 2021 respectively.

10. Secondly, the report does not establish that the Applicant was absent from a “trial” within the meaning of Section 20(3) of the Act , which is central to the Section 20 argument. The report itself confirms that the Applicant appeared during his initial trial and was legally represented throughout the revocation proceedings. Indeed, it states that the Applicant “sought a rehearing of his case by lodging an appeal against Criminal Judgment No. 123 of April 14, 2021,” and that this appeal was “timely filed on April 23, 2021”.

11. A change of legal team does justify the late production of evidence and is not, of itself, a sufficient reason to revisit matters that have already been adjudicated, nor does it satisfy the requirement for due diligence.

12. For these reasons, I refuse the application to adduce fresh evidence. Section 20 Extradition Act 2003

13. The Applicant seeks permission to appeal on the ground that the JA has failed to satisfy the requirements of Section 20 of the Act and/or Article 4a of the amended Framework Decision.

14. Section 20 of the Act is triggered where a person has been convicted in absentia and requires the court to decide whether the person was so convicted. If the person was convicted in absentia, the court then decides if the person “deliberately absented himself from his trial”. If the answer to this is “no”, the judge must then consider whether the person “would be entitled to a retrial or (on appeal) to a review amounting to a retrial”. If the answer to this latter question is in the negative, the requested person must be discharged.

15. The Single Judge, in refusing permission on this ground, stated: “In respect of section 20 of the Extradition Act 2003 , it is not reasonably arguable that the DJ was wrong to order extradition, because the Applicant attended his trial and appeal and section 20 is not triggered by non-attendance at a hearing which related solely to the execution of his original suspended sentence (see the reference to Ardic , Proceedings concerning ( Case C-571/17PPU ) EU:C:2017:1026, ECJ in Murin v District Court in Prague, Czech Republic [2018] EWHC 1532 (Admin) )”.

16. The Applicant’s argument on renewal maintains that both the Single Judge and the District were wrong not to interpret the facts in the present case as falling with the line of authority exemplified by Openbaar Ministerie v Tadas Tupikas C-270/17 PPU, which characterises appeal proceedings in Romania as the relevant “trial resulting in the decision” for the purposes of Article 4a. In support of this argument the Applicant drew attention to the fact that the “guarantee” under Box D3.4 of the AW was initially ticked but then withdrawn. The AW itself, as initially issued, had ticked Box D3.4, indicating that the person named was not personally served with the decision but would be without delay after surrender, and would be expressly informed of their right to a retrial or appeal allowing re-examination of the merits. However, subsequent information from the JA stated that Box D3.4 was ticked by mistake, as the Applicant had already exercised his right to appeal on 23 April 2021; the appeal then being rejected. This communication further stated that the Applicant could no longer request a retrial or file an appeal and had deliberately absented himself from the final sentencing decision. Interpretation of “Trial Resulting in the Decision”

17. In the recent case of Pawel Kalandyk v District Court in Gdansk, Poland [2025] EWHC 602 (Admin) , Collins Rice J meticulously examined the scope of “trial resulting in the decision” for the purposes of Section 20 and Article 4a(1) of the Framework Decision. That case involved an individual whose suspended sentence was activated due to subsequent convictions and a failure to pay compensation. The central question was whether the suspended sentence activation hearing itself, or the proceedings leading to the subsequent convictions, constituted a “trial resulting in the decision” that would engage the protections of Section 20 .

18. Collins Rice J affirmed the long-standing principle established in Openbaar Ministerie v Ardic (C-571/17 PPU) EU:C:2017:1026, that decisions solely relating to the execution or application of a final custodial sentence do not fall within the scope of Article 4a(1) unless they modify the nature or quantum of the sentence originally imposed. She said, “‘the decision’ had to be understood as ‘referring to the proceeding that led to the judicial decision which finally sentenced the person whose surrender is sought’”. The fact that further discretionary judicial decisions might be involved in activating a suspended sentence does not alter this, provided those decisions cannot change the original sentence itself. This means that Section 20 is not triggered by non-attendance at a hearing solely related to the execution of a suspended sentence.

19. Furthermore, Kalandyk critically analysed LU & PH v Ministry of Justice and Equality (C-514/21 and C-515/21) EU:C:2023:235, upon which the Applicant had sought to rely. Collins Rice J clarified that LU & PH reaffirmed the Ardic principle, stating that the activation hearing itself is not a relevant hearing for extradition purposes. While LU & PH held that a subsequent conviction (if it led to the activation of a suspended sentence and was obtained in absentia) would fall within Article 4a(1), this does not mean that the activation proceedings themselves are subject to Section 20 scrutiny. Indeed, Collins Rice J noted that the fact that a court considering suspended sentence activation has a general discretion in that matter, is not relevant for Article 6 purposes, “as long as that margin of discretion does not allow it to modify either the quantum or the nature of the custodial sentence”. She concluded that LU & PH “expressly confirms that activation hearings remain irrelevant for extradition purposes”. Application to the Present Case

20. The principles enunciated in Kalandyk directly bear upon this application. Extradition is sought in relation to the activation of a suspended sentence for driving without a licence, initially imposed on 13 June 2019 and finalised on 10 July 2019. The decision to activate this sentence was made on 14 April 2021. The Applicant was present at his initial trial and subsequently lodged an appeal against the activation decision on 23 April 2021, which was rejected.

21. Applying the reasoning in Kalandyk , and by extension the principles of Ardic and LU & PH , the proceedings in Romania that led to the activation of the Applicant’s suspended sentence are not a “trial resulting in the decision” for the purposes of Section 20 . This is because these proceedings did not determine his guilt in relation to the original offence, nor did they alter the nature or quantum of the sentence initially imposed. They concerned only the execution of a pre-existing, final sentence.

22. The fact that the Applicant exercised his right to appeal the activation decision, or that he was represented during these proceedings, does not bring them within the scope of Section 20 . As Kalandyk highlights, the relevant Article 6 rights apply fully at the point of the original sentence, not subsequently in relation to its execution, even where discretionary judicial decisions are involved, provided these do not alter the sentence itself.

23. The Applicant’s argument, stemming from Tupikas and reinforced by his interpretation of LU & PH, that the appeal proceedings in Romania are the relevant “trial” is inconsistent with the approach set out above. While Tupikas decided that an appeal can be the “trial resulting in the decision” if it involves a re-examination of the merits in fact and in law, for the reasons set out in Kalandyk this does not extend to hearings concerning the execution of a sentence or the activation of a suspended sentence, unless they modify the core elements of the original sentence. The JA has clarified that the box indicating a right to retrial (D3.4) was ticked by mistake because the Applicant had already exercised his right to appeal the activation decision, which was rejected. The argument that the warrant is ambiguous so leaving opening the possibility of a Tupikas argument is therefore unsustainable on the facts.

24. It follows that the Section 20 bar to extradition is not engaged in this case. The absence of the Applicant from the activation hearing, or any subsequent appeal in relation to it, would not fall within the ambit of a “trial in absentia” as understood for extradition purposes.

25. In fact, in the present case, the Applicant states in his written evidence that he pleaded guilty, attended all hearings, and received a suspended sentence. He further states that this suspended sentence was activated in 2021 due to a breach of conditions. He was present at first instance and lodged an appeal on 23 April 2021. The Applicant was represented by a public defender during the appeal. The relevant chronological facts show the original conviction on 13 June 2019, the activation decision on 14 April 2021, and the appeal against activation on 23 April 2021, which was rejected.

26. I am therefore satisfied that the District Judge was not arguably incorrect in her assessment. The Applicant was present at the original trial, and the subsequent proceedings related to the activation of a suspended sentence, not a new determination of guilt or imposition of sentence that would trigger the protections of Section 20 as interpreted by Tupikas . The Ardic principle, as affirmed in Murin and Kalandyk is clearly to the effect that Section 20 is not engaged by non-attendance at a hearing related solely to the execution of a suspended sentence, where the original conviction was final, and the individual had the opportunity to participate in that initial trial. This is precisely the scenario in this case.

27. I can find no error in the District Judge’s application of the law, nor in the reasoning of the Single Judge. The Section 20 ground, which hinges on the characterisation of the Romanian proceedings, is not reasonably arguable in light of the established law concerning suspended sentence activation. Conclusion

28. For the reasons set out above, there is no reasonable arguable basis for the proposed appeal. Accordingly, the renewed application for permission to appeal is refused. END